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Preface
My career as PhD student at University of Milan started 3 years ago, in January
2010. After a bachelor and a master thesis on Game Theory, I was really interested
in continuing my research on this subject, when my PhD supervisor, Prof. Fragnelli,
proposed me to start working on voting systems. I immediately found the topic actual
and fascinating, particularly because of all the problems about the adopted electoral
system and the political scenario my country, Italy, has in these years. It was a very
convincing opportunity of working on Game Theory and on Game Practice in the same
time, because of the concreteness of the problems I was going to deal with.
Some of the results included in this thesis have been taken from some articles I
previously published: the work presented in Chapter 3 contains some results included
in “Chessa M., Fragnelli V., Embedding classical indices in the FP family, Czech
Economic Review, vol.5, 2011, pp. 289-305”, while the work in Chapter 4 has been
presented as invited talk at the workshop “Models of Collusion, Games and Decisions
for Applications to Judging, Selling and Voting” in Monte Isola (BS), Italy, on June
2012 with the title “The Bargaining Set for Sharing the Power ”.
Chapter 5 contains part of analysis presented in “Chessa M., Fragnelli V., A quan-
titative evaluation of veto power, Operations Research and Decisions, Vol.21, 2011”
and in “Chessa M., Fragnelli V., Open Problems in Veto Theory, To appear in: Interna-
tional Game Theory Review”; Chapter 6 presents some results included in “Chessa M.,
Fragnelli V., A note on “Measurement of disproportionality in proportional representa-
tion systems” , Mathematical and Computer Modelling, vol.55, 2012, pp. 1655-1660”.
Chapter 7 contains the work presented as invited talk at the workshop “Models of
Collusion, Games and Decisions for Applications to Judging, Selling and Voting” in
Monte Isola (BS), Italy, on June 2012 with the title “A Generating Functions Approach
for Computing Holler Index Efficiently ”.
In these years I investigated also other branches in which Game Theory could be
useful for; this is the reason why I dealt also with the work on the problem of how to
enhance the research on rare diseases, guaranteeing that every patient, affected by a
rare or by an ordinary disease, could be treated with fairness. The two works I published
on the topic, “Chessa M., Gagliardo S.,Where is the Profit in Rare Diseases Research?,
Operations research for patients - Centered health care delivery, 2010, FrancoAngeli,
pp. 51-57” and “Chessa M., Fragnelli V., Gagliardo S., A coordination model for
enhancing research on rare diseases, Tanfani E. and Testi A. (Eds), Advanced Decision
Making Methods Applied to Health Care, International Series in Operations Research
& Management Science, Vol.173, 2012, pp. 51-66”, even if still studied through a
game theoretical point of view, are not included in this thesis, as I preferred to select
a common and central topic for this dissertation: the voting games.
October 2012,
Michela CHESSA
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many different kinds of voting situations have been studied by social choice theorists
and by game theorists, but one can say that the theory is clearly divided into two
main branches. The first branch is the evaluation of the voting system, i.e. of the
Parliament resulting after an election and of the power share inside it (to which we
dedicate the first part of this thesis). The second branch is the evaluation of the
criteria for the assessment of the voters’ preferences, starting from their preferences
profile (to which we dedicate the second part). The third part of the thesis is dedi-
cated to the definition of a new algorithm to deal with a few computational problems
we encountered during the work on the previous parts. In this thesis we deal with all
these problems using the instruments provided by Game Theory.
The modern Game Theory as interactive decision-making has been originated in
1944, with the publication of the book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
by von Neumann and Morgenstern [95]. Previous works, in fact, were fragmentary
and did not attract much attention, even if they provided some general ideas which
found a concrete organization only with this volume. It was somehow a recompilation
of previous work, but this book provided some new important developments, like the
introduction of information sets and the formal definition of strategy. The authors
treated with coalitions dealing with cooperative games, and introducing the character-
istic form, gave a formal definition to the concept of imputation; however, these are
only some of the wide range of concepts the authors presented. Game Theory as a
structured science is quite “young”, having been developed 70 years ago, more or less.
We find an excellent introduction to Game Theory and its history in the preliminary
part of Essays on Cooperative Games edited by Gambarelli [39].
The year 1944 is also very important because of the appearance of another im-
portant tool which changed our lives in the ensuing 70 years. This tool was the first
computer introduced to the general public, after some precedents in which it had
remained a “military secret”. Also Game Theory, at the beginning, was used for mil-
itary purposes and this is one of the common point this science has with Computer
Science. For example, the first studies in linear programming were developed in order
to solve problems in two-person Game Theory. Later, games required the application
of general mathematics, and this subject became a more mathematical science, using
and requiring concepts coming from general topology, probability, theory of sets, and
many other fields. But Game Theory is nowadays known as a subject which gave
some of the major contributions to the field of economics.
John Harsanyi, John Nash, Reinhard Selten, Robert Aumann, Thomas Schelling,
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Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson, and lately, Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shap-
ley were awarded a Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for their results on economic
studies using Game Theory.
According to Osborne and Rubinstein [78], who wrote one of the most important
surveys on the subject, Game Theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help us
understand the phenomena that we observe when decision-makers interact. The basic
assumptions that underlie the theory are that decision-makers pursue well-defined
exogenous objectives (they are “rational”) and take into account their knowledge or
expectations of other decision-makers’ behavior (they “reason strategically”).
In Game Theory, real-life situations are represented through abstract models and
this allows one to study a wide range of phenomena. A player is the basic entity of
any such theoretical model. He or she may be interpreted as an individual or a group
of individuals making a decision. There are two types of models: those in which the
primitives are the sets of possible actions of individual players, and those in which they
are the sets of possible joint actions of groups of players. Models of the first type
are referred to as noncooperative (and historically, most research has been devoted
to these games), while those of the second type as cooperative. The most commonly
used solution concept for noncooperative games is the Nash equilibrium, while the
most famous one for cooperative games is the Shapley value. We have three ways
of representing a game, strategic, extensive and characteristic form. Characteristic
form can be adopted only to represent cooperative situations.
Another important distinction in games is that in some models the participants
are fully informed about each others’ moves and we call these games with perfect
information. When the players may be imperfectly informed we speak of these games
with imperfect information.
In this thesis we study the model of a cooperative game (even if we will refer occa-
sionally to a noncooperative model). Cooperative games (as suggested by the name)
allow us to represent situations in which the players can cooperate, establishing bind-
ing agreements among themselves and forming coalitions in order to coordinate their
strategies and share their joint payoff. Although actions are taken by coalitions, the
theory is based on the individuals’ preferences over the set of all possible outcomes.
A particular class of cooperative games is given by simple games. Simple games rep-
resent conflicts in which the objective is winning and one of the main applications of
this model is given by voting games. Then, after Computer Science and Economy in
the last years’ Game Theory, it is starting to serve other important disciplines, in this
case, Political Science.
Voting is a very common way of resolving disagreements, determining common
opinions, choosing public policies and finding other solutions to the problem of ag-
gregating a set of individual opinions in a democratic society, transforming many
preferences into one. The most typical voting system may be represented by a simple
game: in order to change policies (the legislative status quo) a certain number of
3individual or collective actors have to vote in order to promote the outcome that they
prefer, voting in favor (Y) or against the proposal (N). In the classical model each
member is called party and party has a voting weight (number of votes, shares etc.)
and a voting rule is defined by a minimal number of weights required for passing a pro-
posal, called quota. Given a voting rule, voting weights provide members with voting
power. Voting power means the ability to influence the outcome of voting sessions
and it is quantified using power indices. Several power indices were proposed in order
to account for different features of the possible situations. For instance the indices
may emphasize the possibility to form different majorities, such as the Banzhaf index
[12], or they may emphasize the importance of the ordering in the majority formation
process. This is the case of the one which is probably the most famous power index:
the Shapley-Shubik index [88]. Other indices may take into account the role played
by the majorities with minimal number of agents, like the Deegan-Packel index [27].
Also, the Public Good index [48], which has been defined by Holler starting from the
idea that the coalition value is a public good, reduces to taking into account only
minimal winning coalitions in its version for voting games.
In dealing with a voting game, anyway, it is important to take into account that
the ideological position of each party does not allow every coalition forming with the
same probability, even if it is winning. In order to include this kind of information
other indices have been defined, introducing the concept of a priori unions (Owen
[81]) for accounting the existing agreements between parties or using a graph (Myer-
son [74]) for representing possible communications among parties. Another common
way to represent a political scenario is via a left-right axis where the parties are or-
dered according to their ideological position. Assuming that the negotiations take
place uniquely between adjacent parties, the feasible coalitions include only contigu-
ous parties and on this idea the FP family was defined by Fragnelli et al. [36]. In
this family only contiguous winning coalitions have a non zero probability to form.
Another parameter is specified, such as the power share among the members of each
coalition. Defining these parameters in a proper way we are able to deal with different
situations and to better describe different real Parliaments. In Chapter 3, we analyze
the way to select the appropriate parameters with the aim of representing classical
power indices from a FP family point of view. We start by relaxing the hypothesis of
contiguity, assigning a non zero probability to form to every winning coalition. Then
we reduce the relevance of noncontiguous coalitions, defining a sequence of indices
that converges to a modified version of the classical indices. When this method is
applied to the Italian lower chamber of 2008, we give a concrete idea of the improve-
ment in the evaluation of the power share we can obtain modifying classical power
indices through the FP indices point of view. Finally, we extend our approach to
situations in which the parties are not necessarily ordered according to the left-right
axis, expressing their relations by a graph, following the idea of Myerson (but showing
how the two approaches are completely different). The idea of defining a sequence of
indices, moreover, suggests to us the possibility of considering an intermediate one,
in case deleting all the noncontiguous coalitions looks too strong and we just want to
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consider them less probable.
Chapter 4 of this thesis is devoted to another problem in the evaluation of the
power share of a Parliament. The solutions are usually carried out following a static
approach, while a dynamic model in which parties may blackmail each other in order
to increase their power at expenses of the others would be, in our opinion, more close
to real-world situations. This model may be solved referring to the bargaining set [10].
Verifying if a vector belongs to the bargaining set may be used to check the robustness
of a power sharing in order to avoid blackmailing behaviors. One of the most negative
features of this solution is its computational complexity, because we need to deter-
mine a sequence of inequalities that represent the conditions under which each player
may raise an objection against each other player forming a different winning coalition,
and another sequence of inequalities that represents the conditions for the existence
of suitable counterobjections. This system of inequalities defines the bargaining set.
Despite the computational complexity, we manage to show a real-world example, the
German Bundestag, in which we are able to calculate the bargaining set due to the
particular structure of its winning coalitions. Moreover, remembering the statement
that in a voting situation just a few coalitions are feasible, we observe that the com-
putation can become much easier while considering only these coalitions, removing
the other possible configurations.
After dealing with the problem of representing in a proper way the power of the
parties in a Parliament, in Chapter 5 we deal with its natural counterpart, the veto
power. In Game Theory the concept of veto is mainly associated with the concept
of veto player. According to the classical definition, in a simple game a veto player
is a player whose approval is fundamental to pass a proposal. The most popular
example of veto is given by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where the
five permanent countries are able alone to block a proposal. The notion of veto player
may be generalized, for several players, to the notion of blocking coalition, which
is a coalition such that the other players outside the coalition are not able to pass a
proposal. The power of veto represents a central topic in politics, and then it is natural
to ask, “how is it evaluated?” This question brought in the last years, an increasing
number of papers and surveys on the topic, but the attention to veto power indices
(power indices which are used to evaluate the power to block instead of the power to
win) in the literature is still less than that devoted to power indices. Two questions
arise at first: are veto power and power analogous concepts? May we evaluate them
with the same instruments?
Our idea is that some different features have to be considered in order to define an
index suitable for analyzing the power of veto. A party, for example, can be able alone
to block a proposal voting against it, but it may not have the possibility to make an
opposite law being approved without the support of other parties. This happens, for
example, in the already cited example of the UNSC, where a permanent member has
full veto power, but not full power according to the classical indices. Moreover, the
concepts of a priori unions and/or of connected coalitions, which have been introduced
5to better represent the relations between parties, are no longer relevant while speaking
about the power of a party which is against the approval of a proposal. In fact, to
block a proposal it is not necessary anymore to have a common ideological position.
Two parties very far from each other can be both because of opposite reasons, decide
to vote against a law, even if this does not mean that they would agree in approving
a common different proposal. We define a new veto power index according to which
a veto player has veto power equal to one, while each other player has a fraction
according to his possibility to block a given proposal. Such an index is quantitative.
In fact we observe that it is no longer necessary that the power of the agents sum up
to a given fixed number, which is normally assumed to be equal to 1, as one, two, or
all the agents of a voting procedure may have full power to block a proposal. This
index that we call the loose protectionism index of player i coincides with the expected
payoff at the Bayesian equilibrium of a suitable noncooperative Bayesian game ([45],
[46] and [47]), which catches the noncooperative point of view of a decision-making
mechanism.
If Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are devoted to the evaluation of the power share inside a
Parliament, then in Chapter 6 we present the second part of this thesis, the evaluation
of the criteria for the assessment of the voters’ preferences.
In a representative democracy different committees, for example Parliaments, are
elected to make decisions on the behalf of the voters. The basis of a democracy lies
then in its electoral system. An electoral system is a set of rules and norms (i.e. a
mechanism) that starting from the preferences of the voting body produces a Parlia-
ment. The electoral system has a great impact on the functioning of democracy so
it is fundamental to select a good one. The choice of the “best” Parliament may be
affected by a lot of facets of the political process, but two of them may be consid-
ered more relevant than the others. The first being representativeness, that depends
on the efficiency of the system in representing electors’ preferences; and the second,
governability that measures the effect on the efficiency of the resulting government.
These two dimensions may be evaluated through the assessment of plausible numeri-
cal indicators. In the 20th century, the wide appearance of proportional systems was
one of the reasons for the development of various methods for measuring the quality
of electoral systems, mainly due to evaluate the representativeness, often called pro-
portionality (or, evaluating the lack of proportionality, called disproportionality), of a
Parliament.
Some scholars proved the impossibility of constructing a proportional system that
allocates seats in an exactly proportional way. The problems regarding proportional
systems are mainly due to two reasons. The first is that the so-called proportional
systems often introduce some modifications in order to enhance other good features,
in primis the governability, excluding the smallest parties, via a threshold, and/or
strengthening the largest parties, via a majority prize. The second is that even with
a perfect proportional system it is necessary to assign an integer number of seats
through some rounding methods. The impossibility of creating an ideal proportional
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electoral system forced researchers to search for quantitative indices that would re-
flect the degree to which the system satisfies certain conditions. Such indices contain
quantitative information and allow researchers to conduct empirical research and com-
pare various electoral systems. Then, in Chapter 6, starting from the work of Karpov
[55], who studied the properties of nineteen disproportionality indices applying them
to four electoral sessions in Russia, we introduce the indices proposed by Ortona [34],
Fragnelli [32] and Gambarelli and Biella [40]. In particular, the last two indices account
for the issue of power for measuring the disproportionality. In our mind, the power,
such as the influence of each party on the decision of passing a law, should play a more
relevant role in evaluating the characteristics of a Parliament, and, as suggested by
Fragnelli et al. [34], the notion of power has a lot to do with the choice of the electoral
system, both with governability and with representativeness. Doing simulations, they
use a power-based index to define governability, similarly, in this thesis we propose to
analyze what happens in the evaluation of representativeness while using power-based
indices. It is possible that an apparently unfair distribution of seats with respect to
votes may provide the parties the same power of their voters, so we can conclude
that the voting body is well represented by the Parliament if the representativeness
(the disproportionality) is measured by an index accounting the issue of power. In this
case, the classical indices listed by Karpov may assign a high level of disproportionality
to the system.
As the idea of assigning the seats by only looking at the power share, one can look
hard to be accepted, as it can sometimes provide counterintuitive results. In the last
part we suggest the idea of adopting the issue of power in order to define a rounding
method, which minimizes the differences of the power share.
With the aim of computing the power on the vote share after the election of the
Russian Parliament (State Duma), in order to evaluate the representativeness using a
power-based index, we had the necessity to solve another problem: to find an efficient
way to evaluate the Public Good index, which was introduced by Holler in 1982 [48].
In the third and last part of this thesis in Chapter 7, we deal with another important
problem; the computation of power indices can be very hard, especially when the
number of players is high.
The problem of calculating power indices in a reasonable amount of time is of
great interest since the first power indices have been defined. Some classical indices
require the enumeration of all coalitions and this becomes computationally complex
as soon as the number of players increases. This can happen also for those indices,
e.g. the Public Good index, which takes into account only minimal winning coalitions.
Also, selecting the minimal winning ones may require in the worst case running the
enumeration of all of them.
The big number of players did not allow us to make the computation through an
ordinary algorithm. To evaluate the power through the Holler index is very interest-
ing as it considers only minimal winning coalitions and it proposes, then, a different
approach compared, for example to the Shapley-Shubik index. Differently from the
7classical indices, moreover, it does not have the property of monotonicity. In 1962,
Mann and Shapley [63] proposed an exact calculation of the Shapley-Shubik index,
following an idea due to David G. Cantor, to evaluate this index for large voting games,
i.e. games with a high number of players. This idea, together with ramifications, has
made it possible to calculate the exact power in a reasonable amount of time and
it has been adopted, in the following years, to exactly calculate many other indices.
We use a generating functions approach in order to compute the Public Good index,
following the previous works but facing many problems because of the minimality of
the coalitions, which are taken into account by this index. As it is not possible to
do this computation using a generating function which is similar to the ones used to
compute, for example, the Shapley-Shubik, we introduce some recursive generating
functions, using a noncommutative operator, which allows us computing the Public
Good index exactly and efficiently. We then provide an analysis of the computational
complexity of the proposed algorithm.
The first part of this thesis, including Chapters 3, 4 and 5 is dedicated to voting
systems once they have already been formed. The second part, including Chapter
6, deals with the evaluation of the criteria for assessment of the voters’ preferences
based on proportionality. The last part, including Chapter 7, shows a computational
algorithm to evaluate a specific power index, the Public Good index, for which an
exact and efficient program had not been implemented yet.
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2.1 TU Games
This section is devoted to illustrate some preliminaries in Game Theory, in particular
in the field of cooperative games. We refer to Osborne and Rubinstein [78] for a more
accurate illustration of the following concepts.
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU game, consists of a pair (N, v)
where
i N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players;
ii v : 2N → R is the characteristic function that associates with every nonempty
subset S of N, a coalition, a real number v(S), the worth of S, representing
the total payoff to this coalition of players when they cooperate, whatever the
remaining players do. By convention, we assume v(∅) = 0.
We denote GN the class of games with players set N and we call N, the coalition
containing all the players, the grand coalition.
The subgame of (N, v) with respect to coalition S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ is defined as the
TU game (S, vS) with vS(T ) = v(T ) for all T ⊆ S.
A game in GN is called
• monotonic, if S ⊆ T ⇒ v(S) ≤ v(T );
• superadditive, if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for each S, T ⊆ N s.t. S ∩ T = ∅;
• cohesive, if for each partition {S1, . . . , Sk} of N,
∑
i=1...k v(Si) ≤ v(N);
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• convex, if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) for each S, T ⊆ N.
A convex game is superadditive and a superadditive game is cohesive. Obviously, a
convex game is cohesive.
A simple game is a monotonic game with characteristic function such that v :
2N → {0, 1} and v(N) = 1. When a simple game is adopted to describe a voting
situation, we can refer to a player as a party. In a simple game a coalition S is winning
if v(S) = 1, losing if v(S) = 0. Given a winning coalition S, if v(T ) = 0 for each
T ⊂ S, we say that S is a minimal winning coalition, if there exists at least one player
i ∈ S s.t. v(S \ {i}) = 0, S is a quasi-minimal winning coalition. We denote with W
the set of all winning coalitions, with Wm the set of all minimal winning coalitions and
with W qm the set of all quasi-minimal winning coalitions. We use indifferently (N, v),
(N,W ) or (N,Wm) to denote a simple TU game, as listing the set of winning or of
minimal winning coalitions is sufficient to uniquely define the characteristic function.
A veto player is a player i that belongs to all winning coalitions, i.e. for each S ∈ W ,
then i ∈ S. A dictator is a player that is winning without any support, i.e. {i} ∈ W .
Given a coalition S ∈ W , a player i ∈ S is critical for S if S \ {i} /∈ W . The quantity
v(S)− v(S \ {i}) is called the marginal contribution of player i w.r.t. S.
Given a game (N,W ), the set of coalitions 2N splits into four classes (from Carreras
[22]), namely:
• D (decisive winning): S ∈ W such that N \ S /∈ W ;
• C (conflictive winning): S ∈ W such that N \ S ∈ W ;
• Q (blocking): S /∈ W such that N \ S /∈ W ;
• P (strictly losing): S /∈ W such that N \ S ∈ W .
Thus, W = D ∪ C. The family Q is called the blocking family ; the game is strong if
Q = ∅ and weak otherwise. The game is proper if C = ∅ and improper otherwise.
When a game is proper and strong, it is called decisive.
A particular class of simple games is represented by the weighted majority games.
Given the set of players N we can consider the weighted majority situation [q;w1, . . . , wn],
where q is the majority quota and w1, . . . , wn are the weights with 0 < q ≤ w(N) =∑n
i=1 wi . For each S ⊆ N we denote w(S) =
∑
i∈S wi . The corresponding weighted
majority game (N, v) has characteristic function defined as
v(S) =
{
1 if w(S) ≥ q
0 otherwise
∀S ⊆ N.
Usually we ask that the game is proper; for this aim it is sufficient to choose q >
1
2w(N). Note that a weighted majority situation always corresponds to a simple
game, while the opposite is not true.
The dual game of (N,W ) is the game (N,W ∗) where W ∗ = {S ⊆ N : N \ S /∈ W}.
Notice that W ∗ = D ∪Q, D∗ = D, C∗ = Q, Q∗ = C and P ∗ = P .
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2.2 Solutions of TU Games
We introduce now the basic concepts of solutions, which are divided between set
valued and pointwise solutions. They are usually defined only for cohesive games,
but we will give the definition in general for every game, as, particularly in voting
situations, it is sometimes interesting to consider games which do not respect this
property, like, for example, the dual of a simple proper game.
2.2.1 Set Valued Solutions
Given a game (N, v), an allocation is a n-dimensional vector (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RN as-
signing to player i ∈ N the amount xi . For each S ⊆ N, we denote x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi .
The imputation set is defined by
I(v) = {x ∈ RN |x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v(i) ∀i ∈ N};
i.e. by those allocations which are efficient (x(N) = v(N)) and individually rational
(xi ≥ v(i) ∀i ∈ N).
The core is the set of imputations which are also coalitionally rational, i.e.
C(v) = {x ∈ I(v)|x(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N};
thus the core is the set of outcomes satisfying a system of weak linear inequalities
and hence is closed and convex. A core element is stable in the sense that if such
a vector is proposed as allocation for the grand coalition, no coalition will have an
incentive to split off and cooperate on its own. The idea behind the core is analogous
to that behind a Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game: an outcome is stable
if no deviation is profitable. For the Nash equilibrium the possible deviation is for a
single player, while in the core we speak about deviations of groups of players.
The imputation set and the core can be empty. A game is called balanced if its
core is nonempty and totally balanced if the core of each of its subgames is nonempty.
When the game is simple we know that it is balanced if and only if there is at least
one veto player.
2.2.2 Solutions and Power Indices
A solution is a function ψ : GN → RN that assigns an allocation ψ(v) to every TU
game belonging to GN . Quite often a solution is required to be efficient, but we have
some examples of solutions which do not respect this property.
For simple games, and in particular for weighted majority games, an efficient solution
is often called a power index, as each component xi may be interpreted as the power
assigned to player i ∈ N.
Some concepts of solution take into account the marginal contribution mi(S) =
v(S)− v(S \ {i}) that player i provides to any coalition S. Between them the Shapley
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value [86] is an efficient solution defined as the average of the marginal contributions
of player i w.r.t. all the possible orderings
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N, S3i
(|S| − 1)!(n − |S|)!
n!
mi(S) ∀i ∈ N; (2.1)
where n = |N|. Its equivalent form for simple games is the Shapley-Shubik index [88],
defined as
φi(v) =
∑
S∈W : S\{i}/∈W
(|S| − 1)!(n − |S|)!
n!
∀i ∈ N. (2.2)
If the game is superadditive, the Shapley value is an imputation, if the game is convex,
it belongs to the core.
The Banzhaf value [12] considers all the marginal contributions of a player to all
possible coalitions, independently from the order of the players
βi(v) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N,S3i
mi(S), ∀i ∈ N. (2.3)
It is often called the Penrose-Banzhaf value or the Banzhaf-Coleman value as in a
previous work in 1946 Penrose [84] and in a later one in 1971 Coleman [26] defined
a value which is formally identical. For simplicity, we will refer to it only referring to
the name of Banzhaf. This value is not efficient, but its normalized version for simple
games, the normalized Banzhaf index, is and it can be written as
βi(v) =
β∗i (v)∑
j∈N β
∗
j (v)
, ∀i ∈ N, (2.4)
where
β∗i (v) =
∑
S∈W : S\{i}/∈W
1, ∀i ∈ N.
We list now three more power indices not based on the marginal contributions. The
formula of the Deegan-Packel index [27] is based only on minimal winning coalitions;
the power is firstly equally divided among them and then the power of each is equally
divided among its members. We denote Wmi = {S ∈ Wm : i ∈ S}, the index is
defined as
δi(v) =
∑
S∈Wmi
1
|Wm|
1
|S| , ∀i ∈ N. (2.5)
The Johnston index [53], instead, considers only the quasi-minimal winning coalitions;
the power is firstly equally divided among them and then the power of each is equally
divided among its critical players. Defined W qmi = {S ∈ W qm : S \ {i} /∈ W} and
Sc = {i ∈ S : S ∈ W,S \ {i} /∈ W}
γi(v) =
∑
S∈W qmi
1
|W qm|
1
|Sc | , ∀i ∈ N. (2.6)
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The Public Good index has been defined by Holler [48] and it counts how many minimal
winning coalitions a player i belongs to. It is defined as
Hi(v) =
|Wmi |∑
j∈N |Wmj |
, ∀i ∈ N. (2.7)
As it is important in the work of the following chapters, we remark that the Shapley
value, the Banzhaf value and the Johnston index are monotonic with respect to the
weights when we are evaluating the power in a weighted majority game, i.e. given
i , j ∈ N, φi(v) = φj(v) when wi = wj and φi(v) ≥ φj(v) when wi > wj . This is not
true for the Deegan-Packel and the Public Good indices.
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter and in the two following ones we consider a real-world voting situation
in which a set of agents has to decide in favour of an issue or against it; we assume
as a model a simple game. Some subsets of agents are able to reach an agreement
that makes the issue approved, while some other subsets may at most decide against
it, but they are not able to pass a counterproposal. We may think to the parties of
a Parliament that have to pass a law, or to a council whose members have to take a
decision. A relevant role is played by those agents that mostly can influence the final
outcome.
Power indices are a relevant tool to measure the influence of each member on
decisions and to allow evaluating the role played by each agent in the process ending
with the formation of a majority. In the last decade they have received increasing
attention in political science, mostly because of the necessity of both to study the
voting power among EU member states and to analyze the effects of institutional
reforms. However, some features of power indices lead some scholars to call their ex-
actness in question. Several power indices were proposed in order to account different
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features of the possible situations; we have already listed some of them in Chapter 2,
like the Shapley-Shubik [88], the normalized Banzhaf [12], the Deegan-Packel [27],
the Johnston [53] and the Public Good [48] indices. Many other indices have been
defined in the following years in order to better represent different situations.
The main critics to the traditional indices are due to the fact that there is no
restriction on the relations between parties and they only aim at representing the
gains that any group of agents obtains from cooperation. In many real situations,
however, before starting the analysis we have information about the behavior of the
players and we know that only partial cooperation may occur. Several models have
been used to represent these situations, including other information in the game: Owen
[81] introduced the concept of a priori unions for accounting the existing agreements
between parties, idea which has been extended by Winter [96] who required that the
different unions may join only according to a predefined scheme, the levels structure;
Myerson [74] proposed to use a graph for representing possible connections among
parties that are the basis for negotiations; Kalai and Samet [54] allowed the possibility
of different roles for the players assigning to each of them a suitable weight.
More recently, the FP family of power indices has been introduced in Fragnelli
et al. [36]. It focuses on the contiguity of the parties of a Parliament ordered on
a left-right axis and the basic idea is that a coalition may form after a negotiation
that includes all the intermediate parties. A simple example of the philosophy behind
this proposal may be given by a party that is never able to change the decision taken
by any other coalition (the so-called null player) but may play an important role due
to its intermediate position that makes it necessary for a positive conclusion of the
negotiation. The indices in the FP family depend on the setting of some parameters,
namely the set of majorities with contiguous parties that are relevant in the situation
at hand, their probabilities to form and the relevance that each member has in each
majority.
Taking into account a restricted set of feasible coalitions, the indices of these fam-
ily allow evaluating the voting power of each party starting from the possible negoti-
ation processes. The resulting power will be influenced by the ideological connections
among the parties in a Parliament and not only by the seat share, as it happens with
the classical indices.
Exploiting the degrees of freedom of the FP family, in this chapter we select the
parameters in order to embed the classical power indices by Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf
(in the normalized version), Deegan-Packel and Holler, in the new family. The moti-
vation is that the modified indices may profit of some features of the classical ones,
adding the relevance assigned to intermediate parties in the new family. Clearly, the
characteristic of assigning a null power to a null player, that is satisfied by the four clas-
sical indices we mentioned, still holds after the embedding; nevertheless some parties
that are relevant in the negotiation process increase their power, while less important
parties decrease their own. The idea of the FP indices remembers the structure pro-
posed by Myerson, but the two approaches are very different and in this chapter we
propose a comparison, in order to underline similarities and deep differences.
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The chapter is structured as follow: in Section 3.2 we recall the two main contribu-
tions to the philosophy of adding more information to the model of a voting situation,
the Myerson value and the Owen value. In Section 3.3 we present the notion of
contiguity and the FP family of power indices; then, in Section 3.4, we present the
procedure to embed the classical indices into this family. The real-world example of
the Italian “Camera dei Deputati” is presented in Section 3.5; two possible extensions
to the model are finally shown in Section 3.6 and in Section 3.7.
3.2 Graph Structure and A Priori Unions
3.2.1 Myerson’s Graph Structure
The way to describe cooperation structures adopted by Myerson [74] in 1977 is by
the concept of a cooperation graph, with which it is possible to model a much greater
variety of cooperation structures than we could with only the concept of coalitions.
We consider a nonoriented graph whose vertices are the parties and whose edges
represent the willingness of the parties corresponding to the vertices to reach an
agreement taking into account their ideological positions. We denote an edge between
parties k and h by k : h. Let gN = {k : h|k ∈ N, h ∈ N, k 6= h} be the complete
graph and let GN = {g|g ⊆ gN} be the set of all graphs on N, each one representing
a possible political situation involving the parties at hand.
Given a subset of parties S ⊆ N and a graph g ∈ GN , we say that k, h ∈ S are
connected in S by g if there exists a path in g from k to h, i.e. a sequence (k0, . . . , k i)
such that k0 = k , k i = h and k j−1 : k j ∈ g and k j ∈ S for j = 1, . . . , i .
A coalition S ⊆ N is connected by g if all pairs k, h ∈ S are connected in S by g. Given
g ∈ GN and S ⊆ N, there is a unique partition of S which groups players together iff
they are connected in S by g, and we will denote this partition by S/g (read S divided
by g). That is
S/g = {{k |k and h are connected in S by g}|h ∈ S}
We can interpret S/g as the collection of smaller coalitions into which S would break
up, if players could only coordinate along links in g.
For any game v ∈ GN and any graph g ∈ GN , define v/g ∈ GN so that
(v/g)(S) =
∑
T⊆S/g
v(T ) ∀S ⊆ N.
So v/g can be interpreted as the TU game which would result if we altered the
situation represented by v , by requiring that players can only coordinate along links in
g. Notice that v/gN = v .
For any game v ∈ GN and any graph g ∈ GN , the Myerson value is defined as
M(v , g) = φ(v/g) (3.1)
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where φ denotes the Shapley value.
The idea behind the Myerson value is then to reduce the game, according to a
cooperation graph, and to evaluate the Shapley value of the reduced game. When
considering a simple game, the reduced game is a game in which the losing coalitions
of the original game remain losing, while the winning coalitions remain winning if they
contain a connected component which is winning. We show in Example 3.2.1 how
the game can change introducing a connection graph and how the Myerson value can
give a totally different share of the power from the Shapley value.
Example 3.2.1. Consider the weighted majority situation [6; 4, 2, 2, 2] and the asso-
ciated weighted majority game. The set of winning coalition is
W = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} and the
Shapley value is given by the vector φ(v) =
(
3
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
.
We suppose now that the possible connections between the players are the ones
given by graph g in Figure 3.1. The winning coalitions for the reduced game v/g are
Figure 3.1: Connection graph g
only {2, 3, 4} and {1, 2, 3, 4}, as for example (v/g)({1, 2}) = v({1}) + v({2}) = 0 or
(v/g)({1, 2, 4}) = v({1}) + v({2, 4}) = 0. The resulting Myerson value of the game
is given by the vector M(v , g) =
(
0, 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
. We simply notice that player 1, who had
the highest power according to the Shapley value, has now power zero, as he is not
connected to any other player and he is not able to reach the majority quota alone.
This simple example shows also the nonmonotonicity of the Myerson value (player 1
is the one with the highest weight), which is a property which is always satisfied by
the Shapley value.
3.2.2 Owen’s A Priory Unions
With the same aim of including new information in the description of a game, but
adopting a different approach, in the same year, 1977, Owen [81] defined a value
based on the idea of a priori unions. It is a modification of the Shapley value so as
to take into account the possibility that some players, because of personal affinities,
may be more likely to act together than others.
Given the set of players N, we denote by PN the set of all partitions of N. An
element P ∈ PN is called a coalition structure and it describes the a priori unions on
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N. We denote as (N, v, P ) the game (N, v) with the coalition structure P . For any
game (N, v, P ) with P = {P1, . . . , Pu}, the quotient game is the simple game (U,w),
where the set of players U = {1, . . . , u} is given by the unions and a set R ⊆ U has
value w(R) = v(∪k∈RPk); in particular, in a simple game R is a winning coalition in
(U,w) if ∪k∈RPk is a winning coalition in (N, v). The quotient game represents the
game played among the coalitions of the partition. The Shapley value of the game
(U,w) assigns a part of the total value to each of the coalitions Pk . The Owen value
allocates the value assigned to the coalitions among its members according to the
philosophy of the Shapley value. Hence, the share of the value that each member
of the coalition gets is determined using marginal contributions. Formally, the Owen
value of the game (N, v, P ) is given by the following formula. Take i ∈ N and let Pk
be the unique coalition of the partition P to which i belongs, i.e. i ∈ Pk ∈ P . Then
ψi(v , P ) =
∑
Q⊆P,Q3Pk
∑
S⊆Pk ,S3i
(|S| − 1)!(|Pk | − |S|)!(|Q| − 1)!(|P | − |Q|)!
|Pk |!|P |!
·(v(∪Ph∈QPh ∪ S)− v((∪Ph∈QPh ∪ S) \ {i})) ∀i ∈ N.
(3.2)
3.3 The FP Family
The indices of Myerson and Owen deal with the problem of taking into account the
affinities between the players; in simple games, and in particular in voting games,
this allows giving a more realistic representation of the power share. Later, different
authors dealt with the problem of describing more sophisticated models; we can men-
tion, between the others, Vázquez-Brage et al. [94] and Alonso-Meijide et al. [4],
who studied games with both the generalization jointly, i.e. games with a priori unions
and graph restricted communication.
The work of this chapter follows the idea of Fragnelli et al. [36], who introduced
the FP family of indices to evaluate the power in a voting situation.
We consider a weighted majority situation [q;w1, . . . , wn] and the associated
weighted majority game (N, v). As in a realistic situation, the ideological position
of each party does not allow every coalition forming with the same probability, even
if it is winning. A common scheme to describe a political scenario is to represent
the parties on a left-right axis, via a suitable analysis of their ideologies, and we sup-
pose that the players are ordered according to their position on this axis. Usually,
the axis is represented by the segment 0-1 and the locations of the parties represent
their ideology, where 0 is the extreme left and 1 the extreme right. Assuming that
the negotiations take place uniquely between adjacent parties, the feasible coalitions
include only contiguous parties. A coalition S ⊆ N is contiguous if for all i , j ∈ S if
there exists k ∈ N with i < k < j then k ∈ S. An example of contiguous coalition
and of noncontiguous coalition is given in Figure 3.2 and in Figure 3.3, respectively.
Formally, let W c be the set of contiguous winning coalitions, the general formula of
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Figure 3.2: Contiguous coalition on a left-right axis
Figure 3.3: Noncontiguous coalition on a left-right axis
an FP index is
FPi =
∑
S∈W c , S3i
αSβSi ∀i ∈ N, (3.3)
where αS ≥ 0 represents the relative probability of coalition S to form, with the
condition ∑
S∈W c
αS = 1 (3.4)
and βSi ≥ 0 is the power share assigned to player i ∈ S, with the condition∑
i∈S
βSi = 1 ∀S ∈ W c . (3.5)
The choice of parameters αS differentiates the power of the coalitions and the choice
of parameters βSi differentiates the role of the parties inside coalitions. We address to
Fragnelli et al. [36] for possible methods to compute the values of the parameters that
account for ideological distances (assuming for example that the higher the distance
between the extreme parties of a coalition, the less the probability of such a coalition to
form), number of parties in the majority (minimal winning coalitions can be considered
the only ones with a nonzero probability to form), their number of seats or via a suitable
analysis of historical data. In general we can notice that only contiguous coalitions
are given a probability to form. In particular, we remark that the definition of the
FP family allows considering even a subset of contiguous winning coalitions, but this
is equivalent to assigning a null probability to the remaining ones. Fragnelli et al.
proposed a possible choice of the parameters defining the following index belonging
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to the FP family, of which it is the “archetype”
FPArci =
∑
S∈W c ,S3i
1
|W c |
1
|S| ∀i ∈ N; (3.6)
in this case the unitary power is equally shared among the coalitions in W c and in
the second step the quota assigned to each coalition S is equally shared among its
members.
3.4 Embedding Classical Indices into the FP Family
In this section we want to embed classical indices in the general structure of the FP
family. Our work is focused on weighted majority games and we start noticing that
in general, classical indices do not take into account only the contiguous coalitions,
as they are not based on a left-right axis structure. In order to embed them in the
FP family, we need an extension of the formula (3.3) which allows the winning but
noncontiguous coalitions to have a probability to form and only in a following step we
will look for a standard FP index, summing only on the contiguous winning coalitions.
We define the extended family FP as
FP i =
∑
S∈W,S3i
αSβSi ∀i ∈ N (3.7)
where αS ≥ 0 and βSi ≥ 0 have the same interpretation as above, with the conditions∑
S∈W
αi = 1 (3.8)
and ∑
i∈S
βSi = 1 ∀S ∈ W. (3.9)
This is an extension of the previous family because it is sufficient to assign αS = 0
for each S ∈ W \W c to obtain an FP index.
In order to embed a generic index ψ into the FP family, we have to impose the
relations ∑
S∈W,S3i
αSβSi = ψi(v) ∀i ∈ N (3.10)
and to make a suitable choice of the parameters in order to have this relation verified.
In particular, we will analyze the way to embed the Shapley-Shubik, the normalized
Banzhaf, the Deegan-Packel and the Holler indices. We can observe that there are
several choices of the parameters in order to satisfy relations (3.10) as the system
is overdetermined. For instance, a trivial solution is given by αN = 1 for the grand
coalition and zero for the others αS, S 6= N and βSi = ψi . This solution is not very
interesting as it allows only the grand coalition forming and it assumes we already
know the value of the index in order to evaluate the parameters βSi . We look now
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for a non trivial solution, at first for the Shapley-Shubik index and then for the other
indices.
We just want to remember that the final aim of this chapter is to combine the is-
sue of contiguity with the philosophy of the classical indices (for instance the marginal
contribution for the Shapley-Shubik and the normalized Banzhaf indices and the min-
imal winning coalitions for the Holler and the Deegan-Packel indices). After defining
the appropriate parameters to write as FP indices the classical ones, we will introduce
the idea of contiguity.
3.4.1 Embedding the Shapley-Shubik Index
Following the purpose of embedding classical indices in the FP family, we start from
the most common one, the Shapley-Shubik index. In particular, the first aim is to
determine suitable values for the parameters in (3.7) in order to describe the formula
given in (2.1). We start by imposing that
αSβSi = p(S)[v(S)− v(S \ {i})] ∀S ∈ W, ∀i ∈ S (3.11)
where
p(S) =
(|S| − 1)!(n − |S|)!
n!
. (3.12)
Summing on i ∈ S and because of the condition (3.9) this is equal to
αS = p(S)
∑
i∈S
[v(S)− v(S \ {i})] ∀S ∈ W.
We remember that we denoted the set of the critical players of S as Sc , we call
cS = |Sc | and we can write the parameters αS as
αS = p(S)cS ∀S ∈ W. (3.13)
Condition (3.8) holds as∑
S∈W
∑
i∈S
p(S)[v(S)− v(S \ {i})] =
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈W,S3i
p(S)[v(S)− v(S \ {i})] = 1
because of the efficiency of the Shapley-Shubik index.
By relations (3.11) and (3.13) we obtain
βSip(S)cS = p(S)[v(S)− v(S \ {i})] ∀S ∈ W, ∀i ∈ S.
It is sufficient to observe that if player i is critical for S then v(S)− v(S \ {i}) = 1,
otherwise v(S)− v(S \ {i}) = 0, from which we get
βSi =

1
cS
if i ∈ Sc
0 otherwise
∀S ∈ W (3.14)
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Relations (3.13) and (3.14) provide the parameters αS and βSi , respectively, that
enable us to write the Shapley-Shubik index as an FP index.
In the definition of the FP indices family, the order of the parties is not important
and we do not refer to the left-right axis. We want now to come back to the idea of
contiguous coalitions as the only alliances which are allowed forming, so the power of
a party depends only on the coalitions in W c it belongs to. In order to obtain an FP
index, we decrease the probability to form of the noncontiguous coalitions modifying
the parameters αS given in (3.13). For each coalition S ∈ W we introduce a sequence
of parameters ((γS)t)t∈N defined as
(γS)t =
{
p(S)cS if S ∈ W c
(p(S)cS)
t if S ∈ W \W c
from which we get a sequence of normalized parameters ((αS)t)t∈N
(αS)t =
(γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
∀S ∈ W
It is easy to check that (αS)1 = αS for each S ∈ W .
In order to decrease the probability of noncontiguous coalitions to form, we take the
limit for t → +∞ which gives us
(γS)t → γ∗S
where
γ∗S =
{
p(S)cS if S ∈ W c
0 if S ∈ W \W c
as p(S)cS < 1 if S 6= N, while N ∈ W c .
Consequently (αS)t converges to α∗S =
γ∗S∑
T∈W γ∗T
that, using the data of the problem,
can be written as
α∗S =

p(S)cS∑
T∈W c p(T )cT
if S ∈ W c
0 if S ∈ W \W c
(3.15)
These values respect condition (3.4) by definition. Note that the sum in (3.15) does
not consider the values p(T )cT for noncontiguous coalitions for which γ∗k = 0.
We can assume that the definition of βSi does not depend on t, so β∗Si = (βSi)t =
βSi for each t ≥ 1.
The values of parameters α∗S and β
∗
Si allow us embedding the Shapley-Shubik index
in the FP family defining a new index φFP
φFPi (v) =
∑
S∈W c ,Sc3i
(
p(S)cS∑
T∈W c p(T )cT
1
cS
)
∀i ∈ N
and, by formula (3.12) we get
φFPi (v) =
∑
S∈W c ,Sc3i
(
(|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!
n! cS∑
T∈W c
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n! cT
1
cS
)
∀i ∈ N (3.16)
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3.4.2 Embedding Other Power Indices
The procedure we used for the Shapley-Shubik index may be applied to any power
index in the family FP . Let us assume we have an FP index given by (3.7) which
respects the conditions (3.8) and (3.9), with the additional hypotheses that αS < 1
for each noncontiguous coalition S ∈ W \W c and αS > 0 for at least one contiguous
coalition S ∈ W c . We may decrease the probability of the noncontiguous coalitions
to form by defining
(γS)t =
{
αS if S ∈ W c
(αS)
t if S ∈ W \W c
and
(αS)t =
(γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
∀S ∈ W (3.17)
whose limit value is
α∗S =

αS∑
T∈W c αT
if S ∈ W c
0 if S ∈ W \W c
(3.18)
Again, we assume that the parameters βSi do not depend on t, i.e. β∗Si = (βSi)t = βSi
for each t ≥ 1.
We notice that for each positive t ∈ N> the vector (FP )t , defined as (FP i)t =∑
S∈W ((αS)tβSi), is a power index that assigns a reduced probability to form to the
noncontiguous winning coalitions, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4.1. For each power index FP and for each t ∈ N> we have that
(FP )t = ((FP 1)t , . . . , (FP n)t) is a power index, i.e. (FP i)t ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N and∑
i∈N(FP i)t = 1.
Proof. (FP i)t ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N and for each t ∈ N> by definition. The value of
(FP i)t for each t ∈ N> is
(FP i)t =
∑
S∈W
((αS)tβSi)
=
∑
S∈W c
(
(γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
βSi
)
+
∑
S∈W\W c
(
(γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
βSi
)
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So∑
i∈N(FP i)t =
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈W c
(
(γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
βSi
)
+
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈W\W c
(
(γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
βSi
)
=
∑
S∈W c
∑
i∈N
(
(γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
βSi
)
+
∑
S∈W\W c
∑
i∈N
(
(γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
βSi
)
=
∑
S∈W c (γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
∑
i∈N
βSi +
∑
S∈W\W c (γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
∑
i∈N
βSi
=
∑
S∈W (γS)t∑
T∈W (γT )t
= 1
To embed the other classical power indices of Banzhaf (in the normalized version),
Deegan-Packel and Holler in the FP family and, consequently, to obtain the corre-
sponding FP indices, is now simply a matter of suitably defining the parameters αS
and βSi .
For the normalized Banzhaf index, the probability of a coalition to form is propor-
tional to the number of critical players. The same holds for the Public Good index,
with the difference that non minimal coalitions have null probability to make an agree-
ment and for each minimal one the number of critical players is equal to the cardinality
of the coalition itself. Differently, the Deegan-Packel index takes into account only
minimal coalitions but it assumes they have all the same probability to create an agree-
ment. The sharing of the power between players inside a given winning coalition is
always given by an equal division between critical players.
By the procedure presented in Section 3.4.1 we obtain the following formulas. For
the normalized Banzhaf index we get
βFPi (v) =
hci∑
k∈N h
c
k
∀i ∈ N (3.19)
where hci counts how many times player i is critical in a contiguous winning coalition.
Embedding the Deegan-Packel index in the FP family, we obtain an index where
the probability to form is the same for all the coalitions in the set Wmc of contiguous
minimal winning coalitions and the power of each coalition is equally divided among
its members
δFPi (v) =
∑
S∈Wmc
1
|Wmc |
1
|S| ∀i ∈ N (3.20)
Finally, the Holler index adapted to the FP family is given by
HFPi (v) =
hmci∑
k∈N h
mc
k
∀i ∈ N (3.21)
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where hmci counts how many times player i belongs to a contiguous minimal winning
coalition.
In Table 3.1 we summarize the choice of the parameters for the normalized
Banzhaf, the Deegan-Packel and the Holler indices, respectively, in order to write
them as FP indices.
Parameters αS βSi
normalized Banzhaf
cS∑
T∈W cT
, S ∈ W
{
1
cS
if i ∈ Sc
0 otherwise
Deegan-Packel
{
1
|Wm| if S ∈ W
m
0 otherwise
{
1
cS
if i ∈ Sc
0 otherwise
Holler
{ cS∑
T∈Wm cT
if S ∈ Wm
0 otherwise
{
1
cS
if i ∈ Sc
0 otherwise
Table 3.1: Parameters to embed some classical indices in the FP family
3.5 The Italian “Camera dei Deputati”: a Real-World Ex-
ample
In this section we apply the results presented in the previous ones to a real Parliament,
the Italian lower chamber, Camera dei Deputati (or Camera). It is formed by 630 seats
and the majority quota is b v2 +1c, where v is the number of voters, excluding absences
and abstentions. The required quorum during a legislative vote is 316 Deputies.
Parties IdV PD UDC PDL LN
Seats 28 218 34 272 60
Table 3.2: Seats allocation in the Italian Camera (April 2008) for the five main parties
The data used in the example are taken from the general election of April 2008;
for sake of simplicity we decided of not considering 18 seats belonging to very small
parties which, historically, have no practical influence on the decisions of the Camera
even if, in theory, they could change the outcome. The remaining 612 seats are
assigned as in Table 3.2 to five parties, from left to right, namely:
• Italia dei Valori (IdV ) - Italy for Values
• Partito Democratico (PD) - Democratic Party
• Unione di Centro (UDC) - Centre Union
• Popolo delle Libertà (PDL) - People for Freedom
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• Lega Nord (LN) - Northern League
The ordering of the parties is assigned according to their willingness to form a coalition
in the recent political history and it is represented by the following left-right axis.
Figure 3.4: Italian Camera on a left-right axis
We suppose that all the Deputies of the five main parties are present and vote
(we ignore situations of absences and abstentions). The majority quota is 307 and
we may represent the Camera as the weighted majority situation [307; 28, 218, 34,
272, 60]. In order to compute the Shapley-Shubik index using the relations in (3.13)
and (3.14), we need the data in Table 3.3 (for each coalition the critical parties are
underlined and βSi = 1cS for each critical party i in each coalition S ∈ W ). Looking
S 24 45 124 134 145 234 235 245 345 1234 1235 1245 1345 2345 12345
p(S) 120
1
20
1
30
1
30
1
30
1
30
1
30
1
30
1
30
1
20
1
20
1
20
1
20
1
20
1
5
αS
6
60
6
60
4
60
6
60
4
60
4
60
6
60
2
60
4
60
3
60
9
60
3
60
3
60 0 0
βSi
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
2
1
3 1
1
2 1
1
3 1 1 - -
Table 3.3: Parameters assigned to the winning coalitions to compute the Shapley-
Shubik index
at the parameters αS, we remark how, according to the Shapley-Shubik index, the
real majority governing coalition {4, 5} has not the highest probability to form, while
the most probable coalition is {1, 2, 3, 5}, that includes the leftmost and rightmost
parties (IdV and LN) and excludes the relative majority party (PDL).
The Shapley-Shubik index of this voting game is
φ(v) =
(
2
60
,
12
60
,
7
60
,
27
60
,
12
60
)
.
Using the procedure previously described, we modify the parameters αS according to
(3.17) and (3.18) and compute the relative FP index given by (3.16)
φFP (v) =
(
0,
2
17
, 0,
10
17
,
5
17
)
.
Figure 3.5 shows the first steps of the procedure of reducing the probability to form
of the noncontiguous coalitions
We complete the example computing the power given to the five parties by the
other classical indices and the modified power obtained with the FP versions. We
summarize the results in Table 3.4.
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Figure 3.5: First 10 steps of the procedure for reducing the probability to form of the
noncontiguous coalitions for the Shapley-Shubik index
Parties IdV PD UDC PDL LN
φ(v) 260
12
60
7
60
27
60
12
60
φFP (v) 0 217 0
10
17
5
17
β(v) 125
5
25
3
25
11
25
5
25
βFP (v) 0 17 0
4
7
2
7
δ(v) 224
5
24
4
24
8
24
5
24
δFP (v) 0 0 0 12
1
2
H(v) 110
2
10
2
10
3
10
2
10
HFP (v) 0 0 0 12
1
2
Table 3.4: Main power indices in the classical and in the modified version
The Shapley-Shubik and the normalized Banzhaf indices assign a positive power
to the small parties, IdV and UDC, as they are critical for some winning coalitions
({1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5} and {1, 2, 3, 5}), none of which is contiguous. Consequently, the
power of these two parties, with the modified indices which take into account only
when a player is critical for a contiguous winning coalition, goes down to zero, even if
one of them, UDC, has an intermediate position on the left-right axis. Allowing only
connected coalitions to form, we expect that this should be beneficial for the centrist
parties, so it is not surprising to assign zero to IdV, as it does not have a central position
in the Parliament, but it seems strange, at a first look, the zero given to UDC. The
reason why of this result is given by the fact that the dummy property filters through
contiguity: a dummy player will remain so, but it is possible that a non dummy player,
as UDC, which has non zero marginal contribution only in noncontiguous coalitions,
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will become dummy once we evaluate the embedded Shapley-Shubik and normalized
Banzhaf indices. This is not true anymore for a generic FP index, which does not
account the philosophy of the marginal contribution.
We say that a party is contiguous-critical for a contiguous winning coalition S if
S \ {i} is losing or is no longer contiguous. If we adopt the definition of contiguous-
critical instead of the definition of critical player, it is possible that a FP index based
on this concept creates power (i.e. it assigns a positive power to a dummy player).
It is interesting to observe how the indices φFP (v) and βFP (v) give a higher power
to the two parties of the actual majority coalition, PDL and LN (greater for PDL,
the party with the relative majority quota of seats), guaranteeing a positive power
to the second party of the Camera for number of seats, PD, which is critical for the
contiguous coalition {2, 3, 4}.
Once we take into account only minimal winning coalitions, as we do when we
evaluate the Deegan-Packel and the Public Good indices, we notice that every party
belongs to at least one of them. But focusing on the contiguous ones, the unique
contiguous minimal winning coalition is the real majority coalition formed by PDL
and LN and the power is equally shared between these two parties, as they are in a
symmetric position.
After the embedding in the FP family, classical indices look like better predicting
the real power of the parties in the formation of a governing coalition, respecting the
ideologies relations among them, which do not allow some coalitions forming.
3.6 From Contiguity to Connectedness
The well known left-right political dimension has been used to characterize key political
differences since the era of the French Revolution. However, it is common to think
that to measure policy spaces requires more than a single dimension (we refer for
example to Benoit and Laver [14]). In order to extend what we have done in the
previous section to a multidimensional space, we notice that the idea of a left-right
axis and of the contiguity of the players naturally remembers the cooperation structure
defined by Myerson, whose model has already been clarified in Section 3.2.1, as the
left-right axis is a particular example of graph in GN , which we can denote as g′ and
in which the notions of contiguity and of connectedness coincide. This can suggest
the possibility of obtaining the embedded power indices by defining a new game in
which the characteristic function v is modified as v ′ s.t. v ′(S) = v(S) if S ∈ W c
and v ′(S) = 0 otherwise and evaluating the classical power indices on this new game.
We underline that this is not the definition of reduced game given by Myerson, in
which a coalition remains winning if it contains a connected winning subcoalition,
because with this new model every nonconnected coalition becomes losing. However,
this procedure produces completely different results from the embedding procedure as
we can immediately notice that (N, v ′) is not a simple game anymore, as it loses the
property of monotonicity. Evaluating the Shapley-Shubik index on this new game, for
example, we may obtain negative values for some parties, so that it may hardly be
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considered as a measure of relevance. Differently from the Myerson value, then, the
procedure of embedding some classical indices in the new family cannot be seen as
the evaluation of these indices on a reduced game.
Taking inspiration from the model of Myerson, we can make an extension of the
FP family applying the results to a generic graph g ∈ GN . The central role played
by the contiguous coalitions is now assigned to the connected ones, then we assume
that the sum is defined on W˜ c , which represents the set of winning coalitions that are
connected in a given graph. Given a graph g ∈ GN , we extend the FP family defining
a new family, denoted by F˜ P , that is based on the set of the coalitions connected
in g, their relative probability to form and a rule for sharing the power inside each
coalition,then
F˜ P i =
∑
S∈W˜ c , S3i
αSβSi ∀i ∈ N, (3.22)
where αS ≥ 0 represents the relative probability of coalition S to form, with the
condition ∑
S∈W˜ c
αS = 1 (3.23)
and βSi ≥ 0 is the power share assigned to player i ∈ S, with the condition∑
i∈S
βSi = 1 ∀S ∈ W˜ c . (3.24)
In order to obtain the embedded version of the classical power indices into this new
family, Formula (3.18) is then modified simply replacing W c with W˜ c , i.e. reducing to
zero the power of the nonconnected coalitions instead of the one of the noncontiguous
coalitions. This approach allows us applying the theoretical results to situation in which
the possible communications between parties are larger.
We may apply the modified procedure to compute the power assigned to the
parties of the example in Section 3.5, when we add an edge connecting PD and LN.
We remark that in the actual Italian political situation these two parties have far
ideologies, but such an agreement took place in 1996 so it is practically feasible. This
cooperation structure is represented by the following graph, denoted by g′′
Figure 3.6: Italian Camera represented through the graph g′′
The computation of the new limit values of the embedded power indices is given
in Table 3.5.
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Parties IdV PD UDC PDL LN
φF˜ P 0 740
5
40
18
40
10
40
βF˜ P 0 316
2
16
7
16
4
16
δF˜ P 0 212
2
12
3
12
5
12
HF˜ P 0 15
1
5
1
5
2
5
Table 3.5: Modified indices related to the connection structure given by graph g′′
Comparing the results in Table 3.4, referred to graph g′, with those in Table 3.5,
related to graph g′′, we may notice that all the indices related to g′′ reduce the power
of the main party, PDL, after the introduction of the new edge. In the new situation
also coalitions that do not include PDL may form.
For a complete analysis of the results we obtained, as we have largely used the
idea of a cooperation structure by Myerson, we compute the Myerson index for both
the situations g′ and g′′ in order to underline some important differences between the
two ideas of solution. The results are shown in Table 3.6.
Parties IdV PD UDC PDL LN
M(v , g′) 0 112
1
12
7
12
3
12
M(v , g′′) 0 16
1
6
1
3
1
3
Table 3.6: The Myerson indices for the game (N, v) of the example of Section 3.5
referred to the graphs g′ and g′′
As expected, the FP index and the Myerson index give different vectors of power.
In particular, we can underline how in our model not necessarily both the parties, PD
and LN, should have the same advantage by allowing a possible agreement between
them. We notice that in this case PD has a higher power when the cooperation struc-
ture is given by g′′, while LN should still prefer the g′ situation. This could not have
been happened using Myerson index as the property of equity1 is always guaranteed.
The lost of power of LN shows that even the property of total stability2 no longer
holds.
We want to focus our attention on another deep difference between the model of
the F˜ P family of power indices and the idea of simply reducing the game through a
graph, like Myerson does. We decided to embed classical power indices into the new
family in order to underline how the obtained results can be corrected introducing the
1 According to equity, introducing (or removing) an edge, both the parties corresponding to its
extreme vertices have the same variation of power.
2 According to stability, after introducing an edge, the variation of power is non negative for both
its extreme vertices.
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notion of connectedness (or of contiguity, if we speak about the FP family). But the
general idea behind the definition of this new family is also the freedom in the choice
of the parameters to better catch some particular situations of incompatibilities of
the agents which cannot be described through other models. Let now consider the
following example, which has been introduced by Fragnelli [33]:
Example 3.6.1. Let (N, v) be the weighted majority game defined starting from the
following weighted majority situation [51; 35, 30, 25, 10]. The set of winning coali-
tions is W = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}.
When the graph representing the possible connections between players is the one
shown in the following figure the set of connected winning coalitions is
Figure 3.7: Example of graph
W˜ c = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}.
Myerson would assume coalition {1, 2, 3, 4} as possible, but we can immediately
notice that player 4 does not want to cooperate with any of the other players, making
such a coalition not likely at all. If we just simply decide to reduce the game accord-
ing to the set of connected winning coalitions, we should assume that all the three
coalitions in W˜ c have a positive probability of forming. But let us suppose that parties
1 and 3 are both available for forming a two-party coalition with party 2 but they do
not want to stay in the same coalition (because of some incompatibilities), so that
also coalition {1, 2, 3} has a zero probability of forming. Then the idea of reducing
the game according to the connectedness would not catch such a situation. We can
modify the definition saying that a coalition may form if the corresponding subgraph
is complete. In this way the graph represents now the situation in which coalitions
{1, 2} and {2, 3} have a positive probability of forming while coalition {1, 2, 3} cannot
form. But if we want now to catch the situation in which, because of the presence
of player 2, players 1 and 3 accept to cooperate, we may add an edge connecting
1 and 3, with the consequence that now also coalition {1, 3} has a strictly positive
probability of forming. Then, the model would one more time not perfectly represent
the compatibilities between the players.
The general definition of the F˜ P family allows us to take into account all the
connected coalitions, and then to assign a probability to each one of them according
to some preliminary information we have about the parties and their wish to cooperate.
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3.7 Intermediate FP Indices
We may observe the loss of monotonicity during the embedding procedure: the issue
of contiguity is “against” the monotonicity, as the connection degree may be more rel-
evant that the number of seats. The nonmonotonicity can be simply seen in Example
3.2.1, where we have already noticed the nonmonotonicity of the Myerson value. In
this example, player 1, the one with the highest weight, has zero power according to
the Myerson value and has zero power with every FP index, as he does not belong
to any contiguous winning coalition. In particular he has zero power with the embed-
ded Shapley-Shubik and normalized Banzhaf indices, whose original versions have the
property of monotonicity.
The idea of giving zero probability to form to the noncontiguous coalitions can
be a strong assumption. It can be observed that, even if it is not very common
that parties with quite different political ideologies can decide to cooperate, it is
still possible they have the necessity to negotiate and make an agreement in some
particular situations. The procedure we showed to obtain an FP index, starting from
an FP one, is based on the idea of putting down to zero the probability of the
noncontiguous coalitions to form, using a sequence of vectors, (FP )t , that for each
value of t ∈ N> provides a power index, where the noncontiguous coalitions have a
reduced, but positive, probability.
It should be clear that the main point is to have a sequence of probability dis-
tributions that reduces to zero the probability of noncontiguous coalitions, leaving a
positive probability to some contiguous coalitions. Consequently, we could make use
of any sequence that satisfies these requirements. The one we proposed in Section
3.4.1 is only a simple way to accomplish the requests. For instance, it is possible to
use different criteria of convergence to zero of noncontiguous coalitions, taking into
account the ideological distance among the parties and to assign different probabilities
to form to the contiguous ones. In particular, via a suitable analysis of real data, we
can choose any vector (FP )t selecting an appropriate value for t. Of course, the
approach of a sequence of values may be replaced by defining a distribution of proba-
bilities that directly assigns zero to noncontiguous coalitions. This idea is very simple
but does not provide us a sequence of power indices. Moreover, the probabilities to
form of contiguous coalitions may result in an index that no longer embeds the original
one.
Finally, a different sequence of probability distributions may give rise to questions
about the sensitivity analysis of the resulting indices, i.e. about how small differences
on the weights of the parties may influence the resulting indices. Some noncontiguous
coalitions, for example, may become winning by varying a bit their weight (or the
opposite can happen) and this can influence the indices obtained by simply reducing
the probability to form of these coalitions.
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4.1 Introduction
The indices of power are used to evaluate the relevance of the agents in a decisional
situation, e.g. a parliamentary voting session in which the agents are the different
parties. The main issue they are based on is the capacity of a party to influence the
approval of a proposal. We may think of this as a static power, i.e. what happens
referring to a precise proposal under discussion. Many indices of power have been
defined and we refer to Section 2.2.2 for a summary of the most famous ones. In
Chapter 3 we analyzed some new solution concepts based on the notions of contiguity
and connectness. Power indices can also be based on the capacity of a party to
influence the rejection of a proposal, so we may account not only the possibility that
the favorable vote casted by a party results in passing a law, but also that a negative
vote leads to the rejection of the law; this situation will be widely studied in Chapter
5 where we will call these indices veto power indices.
On the other hand, we may consider the index of power as a measure of the
influence of the parties on the formation of a government majority. In this chapter,
we account the possibility that a party belonging to the majority coalition may decide
to join to other parties and form a different majority. This may be viewed as a
blackmailing power in the sense that a party may ask for more power when it has an
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effective opportunity for joining to a more profitable coalition and naturally leads to
the evaluation of a dynamic power.
We may think, for example, of a situation in which we have four parties, namely
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The only winning coalitions are {1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 4} and {1, 2, 3, 4}.
We can observe that parties 1 and 4 cannot reject any amount of power assigned to
them, because they do not have any credible alternative to coalitions {1, 2, 3} and
{2, 3, 4} respectively, while party 2 and 3 may blackmail parties 1 and 4 by entering
a more profitable coalition, but they cannot blackmail each other, as they need to be
together to form a majority.
The classical power indices are not designed for accounting this blackmailing be-
havior, that, on the other hand, may be caught by the concept of Bargaining Set
by Aumann and Maschler [10], that is based on the idea that no agent may reject a
division of the value of the game in favor of a better one (objection) if another agent
may reject the new division in favor of a third one (counterobjection).
Motivated by this remark, we propose to refer to the Bargaining Set as a tool for
assigning each party a quota of power that cannot be rationally objected by the other
parties. Unfortunately, the Bargaining Set may be very hard to compute, as already a
result of Maschler himself [64] shows that it is the union of a high number of convex
polyhedra also for games with a small number of players. But, as we have already
discussed in the previous chapter, not every coalition is feasible and the set of minimal
winning coalitions can be restricted in order to make the computation easier, even if
still very hard. Moreover, we suggest to use the concept of Bargaining Set to verify
if a given solution, for example the Shapley-Shubik index, belongs to the Bargaining
Set and is in this sense “stable”. This problem, even if easier, has still a very high
computational complexity.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.2, we provide some more theoret-
ical notions and notations and the results of Maschler on the inequalities to evaluate
the Bargaining Set; in Section 4.3, we describe our proposal; in Section 4.4, we apply
the model to the German Bundestag; in Section 4.5 we discuss how to reduce the
computational complexity in real-world situations, by reducing the number of minimal
winning coalitions; Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Bargaining Set: a Solution Based on a Blackmail-
ing Behaviour
The definition of the core given in Section 2.2.1 does not restrict a coalition’s credible
deviations, beyond imposing a feasibility constraint. In particular it assumes that any
deviation is the end of the story and ignores the fact that a deviation may trigger a
reaction that leads to a different final outcome. Now, we introduce the Bargaining
Set, a solution obtained by considering the discussion that may actually take place
during a play of a game. Thus it considers the possible threats and counterthreats
made by the several players.
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The Bargaining Set was introduced by Aumann and Maschler [10] in 1964 and it
is based on the following concepts of objection and counterobjection.
Given a game (N, v), let x be an imputation and let i and j be two distinct players in
N. An objection of i against j at x is a pair (C, y) satisfying:
i C ⊂ N i ∈ C, j /∈ C;
ii y ∈ Rn y(C) = v(C);
iii yk > xk if k ∈ C.
Given a game (N, v) and an imputation x , let (C, y) be an objection of i against j at
x , i , j ∈ N. A counterobjection of j against i at y is a pair (D, z) satisfying:
i D ⊂ N j ∈ D, i /∈ D;
ii z ∈ Rn z(D) = v(D);
iii zk ≥ yk if k ∈ C ∩D;
iv zk ≥ xk if k ∈ D \ C.
Given a game (N, v), the Bargaining Set is the set M of imputations that have no
justified objection, i.e. whose objections have counterobjections. It is clear that im-
putations that have no objections belong to the Bargaining Set. The Bargaining Set
is nonempty for proper simple games, differently from the core.
The complexity of the evaluation of the Bargaining Set is well-known. The payoffs
of the Bargaining Set are a finite unions of closed convex polyhedra and already in 1966
Maschler [64] provided the system of inequalities that determines these polyhedra in
explicit form, showing how complicated can be the problem of finding the vectors of
the Bargaining Set.
Let x be an imputation for a game (N, v); for any coalition S call e(S, x) = v(S)−
x(S) the excess of S. If the excess of the coalition S is positive, then it measures the
amount that S has to forgo in order for the imputation x to be implemented: it is the
sacrifice that S makes to maintain the social order. If the excess of S is negative then
its absolute value measures the amount over and above the worth of S that S obtains
when the imputation x is implemented: it is the surplus of S in the social order. We
start recalling a criterion for a player having an objection.
Lemma 4.2.1. Let x be an imputation for a game (N, v). Let i and j be two distinct
players in N. Let C ⊆ N s.t. i ∈ C and j /∈ C. In order that i has an objection against
j at x using C, it is necessary and sufficient that e(C, x) > 0.
In order to find a criterion for i having a justified objection against j by using
coalition C, Maschler constructs the (C; i , j ; x)-game.
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Let x be an imputation and (i , j) be an ordered pair of players in N. Let C ⊆ N
s.t. i ∈ C and j /∈ C which contains at least two members. The (C; i , j ; x)-game is
the game (C \ {i}, vC) where vC is defined as follows
vC(S) = Max
(
0,MaxD⊆N,j∈D,i /∈D,D∩C=Se(D, x)
) ∀S ⊆ C \ {i}. (4.1)
We recall the definition of Bondareva and Shapley ([16] and [87]), according to whom
a collection S = {S1, . . . , Sq} of coalitions of N is called balanced if there exist
λ1, . . . , λq, s.t. λi > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , q, called weights and∑
k|i∈Sk
λk = 1 ∀i ∈ N.
A balanced collection is minimal if no proper subcollection is balanced. The weight
vector is unique iff S is a minimal balanced collection. We can now present the im-
portant result of Maschler, which describes the system of inequalities which determine
the Bargaining Set of a game:
Theorem 4.2.2. Let (N, v) be a cooperative game s.t. v(S) ≥ ∑i∈S v(i) for each
S ⊆ N. A necessary and sufficient condition that x = (x1, . . . , xn) belongs to the
Bargaining SetM is
i
∑
i∈N xi = v(N);
ii xi ≥ v(i) ∀i ∈ N;
iii for each ordered pair of distinct players (i , j) and for each coalition C ⊆ N s.t.
i ∈ C and j /∈ C which contains at least two members, either there exists a
coalition D s.t. i /∈ D, j ∈ D, D ∩ C = ∅ and e(D, x) ≥ 0; or
e(C, x) ≤ MaxS∈R
∑
k|Sk∈S
λk(S)vC(Sk),
where vC(Sk) is defined by the Formula (4.1), R is the set of all minimal balanced
collections of C \ {i} and λk(S) is the weight of Sk for S, Sk ∈ S
This theorem provides a set of inequalities connected by the words “and” and “or”.
Maschler provides an easy example of a simple 4-player game, showing that also in this
case the Bargaining Set is the union of 15012 convex polyhedra. On the other side,
in order to check if a particular payoff is in the Bargaining Set, “only” 197 inequalities
need to be checked.
4.2.1 A Particular Vector in the Bargaining Set: the Nucleolus
We now describe another solution that, like the Bargaining Set, is defined by the con-
dition that to every objection there is a counterobjection; it differs from the previous
one in the nature of objections and counterobjections that are considered effective.
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An objection to x is a pair (S, y) s.t. e(S, x) > e(S, y) (i.e. y(S)>x(S)). A
counterobjection to the objection (S, y) is a coalition T s.t. (e(T, y) > e(T, x) (i.e.
x(T ) > y(T ) and e(t, y) ≥ e(S, x)).
Given a game (N, v), the nucleolus is the set of all imputations x with the property
that for every objection (S, y) to x there is a counterobjection to (S, y).
The Nucleolus is always a vector in the Bargaining Set. Montero [73] suggested
to use it as a power index. Her motivation is due to the solid noncooperative founda-
tions this solution has when applied to weighted majority games. We simply suggest
the possibility of using the nucleolus as a measure of power as it is a vector in the
Bargaining Set which is, in general, easier to evaluate.
4.3 The Bargaining Set and the Issue of Power
As we have already said in the Introduction of this chapter, the main motivation of
this work is to model a voting situation through a dynamic approach, accounting the
possibility that after the division of the power a bargaining process starts, and parties
make use also of blackmailing in order to increase their power share. The Bargaining
Set includes those power allocations that have no objection at all or that have no
justified objection, so that these allocations cannot be rejected by the parties using
reasonable arguments, i.e. they are stable. It is easy to see that the two concepts
have a lot of common elements, so when a power index belongs to the Bargaining
Set, it adds the property of avoiding blackmailing behaviors to its own features. Of
course it is possible that no power index, at least one of the most popular, e.g. those
recalled in the Introduction of this thesis, belongs to the Bargaining Set, then in this
case the idea of sharing the power using one of the points in it is a very good way
to protect against possible blackmailing when this issue is considered relevant, as no
party has incentives to deviate from the status quo.
One of the most negative features of the Bargaining Set is its computational
complexity, because we need to determine a sequence of inequalities that represent
the conditions under which each player may raise an objection against each other
player forming a different winning coalition, and another sequence of inequalities that
represents the conditions for the existence of suitable counterobjections. This system
of inequalities defines the Bargaining Set.
On the other hand, the complexity may reduce. In fact, we may remark that in
general the number of parties is seldom larger than 10 and often the parties are in a
symmetric position, so the number of inequalities results to be more tractable. We can
add also a result due to Einy and Wettstein [30] according to which in a simple game
the Bargaining Set coincides with the core when this last one is nonempty; moreover,
it is very easy to check this case as the core of a simple game is nonempty if and
only if there exist veto players, i.e. players that belong to every winning coalition, and
the core is made up by those allocations that divide the unitary power only among
the veto players. In general, even if the evaluation of the Bargaining Set may be very
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difficult, in some real-world situations it is possible to exploit the particular structure
of the winning coalitions, or to reduce the set of feasible minimal winning coalitions,
taking into account the political affinities of the parties. These two approaches allow
us to evaluate the Bargaining Set in the following two examples.
4.4 The German “Bundestag”: a Real-World Example
In this section we illustrate the previous concepts applying them to the 17. Deutscher
Bundestag (17th German Bundestag, German Lower Chamber) that at 3 March 2011
counted 620 Members, divided in 5 parliamentary groups, namely:
• CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion (CDU/CSU) - Christian Democratic Union/Christian
Social Union
• Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) - Social Democratic Party of
Germany
• Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) - Free Democratic Party
• Die Linke (Die Linke) - Left Party
• Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Die Grünen) - Alliance 90/Greens
Party Seats
CDU/CSU 237
SPD 146
FDP 93
Die Linke 76
Die Grünen 68
Table 4.1: German Lower Chamber (2011)
The seat share is shown in Table 4.1 and then the German Bundestag may be
represented by the weighted majority situation [311; 237, 146, 93, 76, 68]; in the related
weighted majority game N = {CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Die Linke, Die Grünen} and the
minimal winning coalitions are {CDU/CSU, SPD}, {CDU/CSU, FDP}, {CDU/CSU,
Die Linke} and {SPD, FDP, Die Linke}. Die Grünen is critical in no coalition, so
it has always a null payoff according to all the classical solutions. We show in Table
4.2 the power share in the German Bundestag according to the Shapley-Shubik, the
normalized Banzhaf, the Deegan Packel, the Johnston and the Public Good indices.
Also according to the Bargaining Set, Die Grünen has zero power, because it
does not belong to any minimal winning coalitions. We have already said that the
computational complexity of the evaluation of the vectors in the Bargaining Set is
very high. We just notice that the other four parties are in the situation of a famous
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Parties CDU/CSU SPD FDP Die Linke Die Grünen
φ(v) 36
1
6
1
6
1
6 0
β(v) 36
1
6
1
6
1
6 0
δ(v) 924
5
24
5
24
5
24 0
γ(v) 2742
5
42
5
42
5
42 0
H(v) 39
2
9
2
9
2
9 0
Table 4.2: Power share in the German Bundestag according to the main power indices
example, called My aunt and I, written by Osborne and Rubinstein [78], and from
which we get that the Bargaining Set of the German Bundestag is:
M =
{
(1− 3α,α,α, α, 0) , 1
7
≤ α ≤ 1
5
}
.
We can notice that the Shapley-Shubik index and the normalized Banzhaf index belong
to M, while the indices of Deegan-Packel and Holler do not belong to M because
they assign a larger power to SPD, FDP and Die Linke. This means that CDU/CSU
could blackmail the other three parties. Also the index of Johnston does not belong
toM, but this time the problem is that it assigns a larger power to CDU/CSU, that
could be blackmailed by SPD, FDP and Die Linke.
4.5 The Catalan Parliament: a Reduced Game
As we noticed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, one of the most negative aspects of the Bar-
gaining Set is the computational complexity; on the other hand, we already remarked
that in a voting situation the complexity may be reduced, as it is possible to consider
a smaller set of minimal winning coalitions to be taken into account, due to different
ideological affinities of the parties.
A simple real-world example of this situation is the Catalan Parliament we present
in Example 4.5.1.
Example 4.5.1. In the Legislature 2003-2007 (see Alonso-Meijide and Carreras [7]),
the Catalan Parliament counted 135 members, divided in five parties, namely:
• Convergència i Unió (CiU) - Catalan nationalist
• Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) - moderate left-wing socialist
• Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) - radical Catalan left-wing nationalist
• Partit Popular de Catalunya (PPC) - conservative
• Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (ICV) - Catalan eurocommunist and ecologist
groups
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Party Seats
CiU 46
PSC 42
ERC 23
PPC 15
ICV 9
Table 4.3: Catalan Parliament (2003)
The seat share is shown in Table 4.3.
The Catalan Parliament corresponds to the following weighted majority situation:
[68; 46, 42, 23, 15, 9]. There are five minimal winning coalitions: {CiU, PSC}, {CiU,
ERC}, {CiU, PPC, ICV }, {PSC, ERC, PPC}, {PSC, ERC, ICV }. Due to ideological
incompatibilities only three minimal coalitions are feasible: {CiU, PSC}, {CiU, ERC},
and {PSC, ERC, ICV }. This means that PPC cannot claim for power as it becomes
a null player in the reduced game.
We now apply the definition of objection and counterobjection in order to evaluate
the Bargaining Set of the reduced game, referring to the parties as 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
instead of CiU, PSC, ERC, PPC and ICV.
Then, we consider the game (N,Wm) with Wm = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3, 5}}. Let
x = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) be an imputation. Player 4 takes necessarily zero. We write
now the inequalities that define the Bargaining Set.
1. Objection of 1 against 2 at x: {1, 3}, with (y1, y3), y1 > x1, y3 > x3 and
y1 + y3 = 1. Then
y3 = 1− y1 < 1− x1. (4.2)
Counterobjection of 2 against 1 at y: {2, 3, 5} with (z2, z3, z5), z2 ≥ x2,
z3 ≥ y3, z5 ≥ x5 and z2 + z3 + z5 = 1 if x2 + y3 + x5 ≤ 1, then if
y3 ≤ 1− x2 − x5. (4.3)
From (4.2) and (4.3) we get
x2 + x5 ≤ x1. (4.4)
2. Objection of 1 against 3 at x: the counts are like at step 1. with player 3
instead of player 2. We get the inequality
x3 + x5 ≤ x1. (4.5)
3. Objection of 1 against 5 at x:
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• {1, 2} with (y1, y2), y1 > x1, y2 > x2 and y1 + y2 = 1. Then
y2 < 1− x1. (4.6)
Counterobjection of 5 against 1 at y: {2, 3, 5} with (z2, z3, z5), z2 ≥ y2,
z3 ≥ x3, z5 ≥ x5 and z2 + z3 + z5 = 1 if y2 + x3 + x5 ≤ 1, then if
y2 ≤ 1− x3 − x5. (4.7)
From (4.6) and (4.7) we get again the inequality in Formula (4.5).
• {1, 3}. This situation is similar to the previous one and leads to the in-
equality already seen in Formula (4.4).
4. Objection of 2 against 1 at x: {2, 3, 5} with (y2, y3, y5), y2 > x2, y3 > x3,
y5 > x5 and y2 + y3 + y5 = 1. Then
y3 < 1− x2 − x5. (4.8)
Counterobjection of 1 against 2 at y: {1, 3} with (z1, z3), z1 ≥ x1 and z3 ≥ y3
if x1 + y3 ≤ 1, then if
y3 ≤ 1− x1. (4.9)
From (4.8) and (4.9) we get
x1 ≤ x2 + x5. (4.10)
5. Objection of 2 against 3 at x: {1, 2} with (y1, y2), y1 > x1, y2 > x2 and
y1 + y2 = 1. Then
y1 < 1− x2. (4.11)
Counterobjection of 3 against 2 at y: {1, 3} with (z1, z3), z1 ≥ y1, z3 ≥ x3 if
y1 + x3 ≤ 1, then if
y1 ≤ 1− x3. (4.12)
From (4.11) and (4.12) we get
x3 ≤ x2. (4.13)
6. Objection of 2 against 5 at x: {1, 2} with (y1, y2), y1 > x1, y2 > x2 and
y1 + y2 = 1. Then
y1 < 1− x2. (4.14)
Counterobjection of 5 against 2 at y: {1, 3, 5} with (z1, z3, z5), z1 ≥ y1,
z3 ≥ x3 and z5 ≥ x5 if y1 + x3 + x5 ≤ 1, then if
y1 ≤ 1− x3 − x5. (4.15)
From (4.14) and (4.15) we get
x3 + x5 ≤ x2. (4.16)
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7. Objection of 3 against 1 at x: The situation is similar to the one at point 4.
and then we easily get the inequality
x1 ≤ x3 + x5. (4.17)
8. Objection of 3 against 2 at x: The situation is similar to the one at point 5.
and then we easily get the inequality
x2 ≤ x3. (4.18)
9. Objection of 3 against 5 at x: The situation is similar to the one at point 6.
and then we easily get the inequality
x2 + x5 ≤ x3. (4.19)
10. Objection of 5 against 1 at x: {2, 3, 5} with (y2, y3, y5), y2 > x2, y3 > x3,
y5 > x5 and y2 + y3 + y5 = 1. Then
y2 < 1− x3 − x5 (4.20)
Counterobjection of 1 against 5 at y:
• {1, 2} with (z1, z2), z1 ≥ x1, z2 ≥ y2 if x1 + y2 ≤ 1, then if
y2 ≤ 1− x1. (4.21)
From (4.20) and (4.21) we get again the inequality in Formula (4.17).
• {1, 3}. This situation is similar to the previous one and leads to the in-
equality already seen in Formula (4.10).
11. Objection of 5 against 2 at x: {1, 3, 5} with (y1, y3, y5), y1 > x1, y3 > x3,
y5 > x5 and y1 + y3 + y5 = 1. Then
y1 < 1− x3 − x5. (4.22)
Counterobjection of 2 against 5 at y: {1, 2} with (z1, z2), z1 ≥ y1, z2 ≥ x2
and z1 + z2 = 1 if y1 + x2 ≤ 1, then if
y1 ≤ 1− x2. (4.23)
From (4.22) and (4.23) we get
x2 ≤ x3 + x5. (4.24)
12. Objection of 5 against 3 at x: The situation is similar to the one at point 11.
and then we easily get the inequality
x3 ≤ x2 + x5. (4.25)
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The Bargaining Set if given by the vectors (x1, x2, x3, 0, x5) which satisfy the
inequalitities (4.4), (4.5), (4.10), (4.13), (4.16), (4.17), (4.18), (4.19), (4.24)
and (4.25), i.e. the following system
x2 + x5 ≤ x1
x3 + x5 ≤ x1
x1 ≤ x2 + x5
x3 ≤ x2
x3 + x5 ≤ x2
x1 ≤ x3 + x5
x2 ≤ x3
x2 + x5 ≤ x3
x2 ≤ x3 + x5
x3 ≤ x2 + x5
It is now easy to verify that the only solution of this system is given by the vector(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0, 0
)
.
We show in Table 4.4 the power share in the Catalan Parliament according to the
Shapley-Shubik, the normalized Banzhaf, the Deegan-Packel, the Johnston and the
Public Good indices. We can simply notice that these vectors do not belong to the
Bargaining Set.
Parties CiU PSC ERC PPC ICV
φ(v) 2560
15
60
15
60 0
5
60
β(v) 512
3
12
3
12 0
1
12
δ(v) 618
5
18
5
18 0
2
18
γ(v) 1836
8
36
8
36 0
2
36
H(v) 27
2
7
2
7 0
1
7
Table 4.4: Power share in the Catalan Parliament according to the main power indices
4.6 Concluding Remarks
The examples of the last two sections show that in the real-world situations the
computational effort for determining the Bargaining Set may strongly reduce.
The situation described by Alonso-Meijide and Carreras was a bit different from
the one we analyzed in the previous section, as the three minimal coalitions we consid-
ered in this example were assumed to be the only feasible coalitions. Anyway, trying
to evaluate the Bargaining Set considering only these coalitions as feasible in order to
make an objection or a counterobjection, the Bargaining Set turns out to be empty
(this is possible as the game does not have all the good properties a usual voting game
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has, such as, for example, the monotonicity). We had then to consider the three fea-
sible coalitions as the minimal ones and to allow the possibility of other coalitions,
containing one of these ones, to form.
In this chapter we propose to account not only the static power of a party in a Par-
liament, but also its dynamic power of blackmailing the others; this reasoning results in
the well-known concept of the Bargaining Set. A negative aspect is its computational
complexity, but in the case of political situations it may be not necessary to account
all the winning coalitions, but only the feasible ones and even if the computation is still
hard, it may be possible and we could provide the Bargaining Set for two real-world
examples whose structure was good enough for the computation. Another important
point is if it is possible to check when the other measures of power belong or not
to the Bargaining Set, in order to verify their stability. This can be computationally
difficult, but still easier that the evaluation of the totality of the stable solutions. In
particular, when it is possible, like in the Example 4.5.1, to evaluate the Bargaining
Set, it can be also interesting to define which of the classical concepts of solution is
the closest to the stability and may better avoid some blackmailing behaviours: in the
example of the Catalan Parliament the Deegan-Packel index is the most stable one
between the proposed indices (using the Euclidean distance).
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the problem of the evaluation of the power of veto, i.e. the
capacity of a party to influence the rejection of a proposal.
The most popular real situation which provides an example of veto is given by the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It is composed of 5 permanent members (a
protecting philosophy during the postwar period brought to the designation of the five
winner countries of the World War II) and 10 nonpermanent members for two-year
terms starting on 1 January, with five replaced each year. We list in Table 5.1 in
alphabetic order the composition of the Security Council in January 2012 and the year
of term’s end or the permanent member status.
Each Council member has one vote and decisions on procedural matters are made
by an affirmative vote of at least 9 of the 15 members. On the other side, decisions on
substantive matters require 9 votes, including the concurring votes of all 5 permanent
members. This rule, called great Power unanimity, is often simply referred to as the
veto power and the 5 permanent members are called veto players 1.
1For further details on the UNSC see http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/index.html, [Online: accessed
27 October 2012]
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Membership year of term’s end
Azerbaijan 2013
China permanent member
Colombia 2012
France permanent member
Germany 2012
Guatemala 2013
India 2012
Morocco 2013
Pakistan 2013
Portugal 2012
Russian Federation permanent member
South Africa 2012
Togo 2013
United Kingdom permanent member
United States permanent member
Table 5.1: Members of the UNSC in January 2012
Among others, functions and powers of the UNSC under the Charter are to main-
tain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes
of the United Nations, which is the primary responsibility, but also to investigate any
dispute or situation which might lead to international friction, to take military action
against an aggressor, etc. The UNSC alone has the power to take decisions which
Member States are compelled to carry out under the Charter.
As observed by Mercik [70], quite intuitively the right of veto will increase the
power of a player in most cases. This is exactly the case of the UNSC, where the five
permanent members have a large power in the decision process of substantive matters,
not only because of the absence of a term-period, but mainly because of their right
to veto.
In Game Theory the concept of veto is mainly associated to the concept of veto
player. According to the classical definition (e.g.Osborne and Rubinstein [78]), in
a simple game a veto player belongs to all winning coalitions. The analysis of the
presence of veto players is fundamental in the study of a simple game, as they are
related to some properties of the game itself. In particular
• if there exists at least one veto player the game is proper;
• there is no veto player if and only if the core is empty;
• if the set of veto players is nonempty then the core is the set of all nonnegative
feasible payoff profiles that share the income only between the veto players.
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These simple observations show how veto players have a central role in a simple game.
The notion of veto player may be generalized, for several players, to the notion of
blocking coalition, that is a coalition such that the other players outside the coalition
are not able to pass a proposal. A more restrictive definition says that a coalition is
blocking if not only its complementary, but also the coalition itself is losing; this is the
definition of the set Q given in Section 2.1.
It is common sense that a veto player has full veto power, but it is interesting to
give an estimation of the intermediate power of those players which are not of veto,
but can block a proposal by forming suitable coalitions. It should be clear that veto
power is larger for larger parties, or agents with higher weights, so it is possible to
increase the veto power of smaller parties introducing a second parameter, usually
imposing not only a higher majority quota, so that the weight of winning coalitions
has to be high enough, but also a minimum number of players that are in favor of the
proposal; in this way the number of blocking coalitions raises (see Peleg [83]). For
instance, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, the qualified majority in the European
Council requires the approval of at least 55 % of the member States that have to
represent al least 65 % of the population of the European Union. Another possibility
for increasing the number of blocking coalitions is to have multicameral systems (see
Gambarelli and Uristani [42]) or endowing the President of the state with the right to
ask for a revision of the proposals.
In a chapter devoted to present the power of veto, it is important to remember
that in Game Theory applied to political studies there is a large literature on the topic.
Tsebelis in his veto players’ theory [93] states that a veto player is an individual or
collective actor whose agreement is necessary for policy changes. The policy stability,
i.e. the impossibility of significant changes of the status quo, is strictly related to
the role of veto players, as a significant policy change has to be approved by all of
them. In his large literature on the topic, Tsebelis analyzes the connections between
veto players and other important features: the agenda control or the production of
significant laws, for example, are strictly related to this topic and veto players’ theory
represents for Tsebelis a way to unify the understanding of politics. Moreover the work
of Tsebelis remembers us to specify another important problem in veto theory: next
to the classical definition of veto player, there exist many others which can provide a
totally different approach to the problem: Tsebelis, for example, assumes it is suffi-
cient to be critical in the actual winning coalition, i.e. to be a crucial cabinet party,
but his opinion has been largely criticized. The problem of how to define and identify
veto players is a controversial point in the studies of a theory of veto.
Stated that the power of veto represents a central topic in politics, it is natural to
ask: how to evaluate it? This question brought, in the last years, to an increasing in
the number of papers and surveys on the topic, but the attention to veto power indices
in the literature is still less than that devoted to power indices. Two questions arise
at first: are veto power and power analogous concepts? May we evaluate them with
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the same instruments? The wide range of existing power indices takes into account
different features. In order to better study political situations, the possible ideological
affinities have been analyzed, accounting possible existing relations among the players.
We dedicated Chapter 3 to this topic.
In this chapter we want to support our idea that some different features have to
be considered in order to define an index suitable for analyzing the power of veto and
the power of blocking (the two concepts will be assumed to be strictly related and a
common theory will be developed). A party, for example, can be able alone to block
a proposal voting against it, but it may not have the possibility to make an opposite
law being approved without the support of other parties; this happens, for example,
to a permanent member of the UNSC, which has full veto power, but not full power
according to the classical indices. Moreover, the concepts of a priori unions (Owen
[81] and [82]), of connected coalitions (Myerson [74]) and of contiguity (Fragnelli et
al. [36], Chessa and Fragnelli [25]), which have been introduced to better represent
the relations between parties, are no longer relevant while speaking about the power of
a party which is against the approval of a proposal. In fact, in order to block a proposal
it is not necessary anymore to have a common ideological position: two parties very
far from each other can be both, because of opposite reasons, decide to vote against
a law, even if this does not mean that they would agree in making a common different
proposal being approved.
After proposing the work of Tsebelis, who analyzed the veto from a politological
point of view, then we present some works which all dealt, in many different ways,
with the same problem: finding a suitable way for analyzing the power of block a
proposal. We start from the work of Carreras ([22] and [23]), where there is a large
analysis of the blocking power in a simple game, both from a collective and from an in-
dividual point of view. The strict protectionism index and the Banzhaf strict blocking
power index are proposed as suitable tools to deal with the problem. After we present
the blockability relation, which has been formalized by Ishikawa and Inohara [52] and
the work of Kitamura and Inohara [57], that just a couple of years after defined the
blockability index, a power index for coalitions. Another important contribution to the
problem is given by Mercik [71], who studied the problem of evaluating the power of
veto using the Johnston power index, suggested after defining some suitable axioms
that an index for veto should satisfy.
In this chapter, after presenting and partially analyzing the cited literature about
veto maintaining an informal tone, we propose a quantitative approach to the prob-
lem of evaluating the power of veto, which takes inspiration from the previous work
of Carreras. We start from the observation that it is not necessary anymore that
the power of the agents sum up to a given fixed number, which is normally assumed
to be equal to 1, as one, two, or all the agents of a voting procedure may have full
power to block a proposal. We will define an index which assigns full veto power (for
simplicity equal to 1) to all those agents who are able alone to veto a proposal; all
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the other players will be given a nonnegative veto power smaller than 1 according to
their possibility to stop an approval joining other players. The definition of this new
veto power index is parallel to the definition of a new power index, that is introduced
in order to give a more complete scenario.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2 we present Tsebelis’ veto
players’ theory, as main contribution to the topic from a politological point of view.
In Section 5.3 we present the contribution of Ishikawa, Kitamura and Inohara, in
Section 5.4 the on going studies of Mercik and in Section 5.5 the work of Carreras. In
Section 5.6 we present our contribution to the topic, with the definition of two new
quantitative indices, one for measuring the power and the other one for measuring the
power of veto; some natural relations with the definition of success and decisiveness
of Laruelle and Carreras are presented in Section 5.7. Finally, the correspondence of
these indices with the Nash equilibria in a Bayesian game is presented in Section 5.8.
5.2 Tsebelis: The Veto Players’ Theory
This section presents one of the most influential conceptions of veto players under
a politological point of view, developed by Tsebelis [93]. In order to change policies
(the legislative status quo) a certain number of individual or collective actors have to
vote in order to promote the outcomes that they prefer. In his veto players’ theory,
he defines a veto player as an actor whose agreement is necessary for a change of the
status quo. According to Ganghof [43], this theory relies on the concept of veto player
in order to unify the comparative analysis of political systems and aims at unifying our
causal understanding of politics. In fact, the configuration of the veto players and the
sequence of them in order to make policy decisions affect the set of outcomes that can
be approved and this common argument is applied to study the main characteristics
of a polity.
Tsebelis distinguishes two types of veto players: institutional and partisan. In-
stitutional veto players are established by a country’s constitution. This happens,
for example, in the US, where the constitution specifies that legislation requires the
approval by the President, the House of Representatives, and the Senate (ignoring
veto overrule). Then, the three actors are the institutional veto players in the US.
By a game theoretical point of view, an institutional veto player is established to be
part of every winning coalition in a game , independently from the possible weighted
majority situation corresponding to the game. Partisan veto players are determined by
the political competition inside a country, i.e. by the political game itself. It may be,
for example, that the US House of Representatives is controlled by a single cohesive
party, and the only successful pieces of legislation are the ones supported by this party.
While the House of Representatives is the institutional veto player, the majority party
is the real partisan veto player. Referring to the classical definition of simple game,
the corresponding weighted majority situation, if it exists, establishes the partisan veto
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players depending on their weight.
Classifying the possible actors endowed with veto power in a parliamentary system,
both institutional and partisan, Tsebelis lists at first the upper house, that, in most the
cases in which it has veto power, is controlled by the same coalition as the government
(but there are some exceptions). Then the head of state, which can be endowed with
veto power, even if this is not very common in West European countries. Lastly, most
of the times veto players are the government partners in a parliamentary system. Even
if veto players can be individual or collective agents, for sake of simplicity, we refer
now to individual veto players. Moving from individual to collective veto players may
generate serious problems for the analysis because they cannot necessarily decide on
what they want. A realistic way to eliminate the problem and to calculate the outcome
of collective choices is to consider the situations in which the decisions of veto players
are taken, for example, by simple or by qualified majority, but we do not enter in details
in this thesis and we address the reader to Tsebelis [93] for a complete analysis of the
problem.
An individual veto player is identified by his ideal point in an n-dimensional policy
space. Every veto player has circular indifference curves and he is indifferent between
alternatives that have the same distance from his ideal point. Given a veto player
located in A and the status quo SQ, he will prefer (and then he will vote in favor of)
anything inside the circle centered in A and with radius |SQ−A|. Each agent has an
ideal point and his main goal is to move the collective decision as close as possible to
this point.
The winset of the status quo (W (SQ)) is the set of points that are preferred over
the status quo by all the veto players, i.e. the set of policies that can replace the
existing one. Obviously, anything out of W (SQ) cannot be approved as at least one
veto player prefers the status quo to the proposal and he will vote against it.
The size of the winset of the status quo has specific consequences on policymak-
ing: significant departures from the status quo are almost impossible when the winset
is small, that is, when veto players are many or when they have significant ideological
distances among them. Tsebelis calls this impossibility for significant departures from
the status quo policy stability. He affirms that W (SQ) does not enlarge with the
number of veto players or with the distance among veto players along a given line.
These two results are then unified affirming that, in one dimension, policy stability de-
pends on the maximum ideological distance among veto players, not directly on their
number. Obviously, adding a new veto player can increase the ideological distance
and, consequently, the policy stability, by reducing the winset of the status quo.
We have already mentioned that Tsebelis’ veto players’ theory aims at unifying the
understanding of politics. Starting from the concept of veto player, Tsebelis analyzes
a wide range of topics: for example, he makes a direct and cross-national test of the
prediction that the number of significant laws produced by a coalition government,
particularly if there are wide ideological differences among government partners, is
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significantly lower than the number of important laws produced by single-party gov-
ernment or by coalitions with partners that agree (see [91]). In the same paper he
observes also that more veto players mean less government control of parliamentary
agenda (which is a very important tool in all collective decision-making bodies, for
further details we address to Nurmi [77]); even if he notices it is not simply a mere
correlation, which of the explanations he provides is closer to the truth is left as an
open question for further investigation. Hug and Tsebelis [51] see in the possibility
of a referendum the introduction of one additional veto player in each country: the
population. As a result, the political outcomes are moved closer to the preferences
of the median voter, but strong policy changes are made more difficult. In a work
of Yataganas and Tsebelis [97] the consequences of the Treaty of Nice, such as the
shifting of the balance of legislative power in favor of the European Council and the
more bureaucratic policy making, are explained using veto players’ theory. The opinion
of the authors is that after the Treaty of Nice the EU’s decision-making process has
become more complex, opaque and difficult.
These ones are just some of the topics that Tsebelis analyzed through veto players’
theory, but the existing literature he provided is much wider (see, for example, [90]
and [92] or the work of Chang and Tsebelis [24]).
Even if Tsebelis’ veto players’ theory is recognized as one of the most influential
in the topic, many competing assumptions have been developed. In particular, we
refer to McGann [67] who affirms that a true veto player must be a member of every
possible winning coalition, according to the classical definition of veto player given
for a simple game, and not only a member of the actual winning coalition. Tsebelis’
theory allows only cabinet parties being veto players, but there are some critics to this
point also by Ganghof and Bräuninger [44]. More generally, the debate on how to
identify veto players shows that how to give a unique interpretation is still an open
problem.
Another problem raised by Ganghof [43] as a critic to Tsebelis’ veto players’ theory
is about how measuring preferences, as they often come from empirical estimates
which may largely differ from the final policy preferences, bringing to a gap between
theory and measurement. A wrong estimate may lead to a failure of the veto players’
theory and of its potential in analyzing political systems, for example in predicting
policy stability.
5.3 Inohara, Ishikawa and Kitamura: The Blockability and
Desirability Relations on a Simple Game
In this section we want to present an important instrument which has been defined to
describe the power to block of the coalitions, opposed to the power to win. As in our
opinion, the authors are convinced that they are deeply different from each other and
we think it is important to dedicate a section to the instruments and the arguments
they illustrate.
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Ishikawa and Inohara [52] propose a new method to compare nonwinning coalitions
in the framework of simple games, the blockability relation. At first they recall the
already existing desirability relation on (N,W ) (c.f. [29]), denoted by d and defined
as: given S, S′ ⊆ N, S d S′ ⇔ for all B ⊆ N such that B ∩ (S ∪ S′) = ∅, if
B ∪ S′ ∈ W then B ∪ S ∈ W . Note that, if S′ ⊆ S, or if S is winning and S′ is
arbitrary, then S d S′. Thus, the “top” of this ranking (preordering) is occupied by
the grand coalition N.
Then, they propose the following blockability relation on (N,W ), denoted by b
and defined as: given S, S′ ⊆ N, S b S′ ⇔ for all T ∈ W , if T \ S′ /∈ W then
T \ S /∈ W . Note that, if S′ ⊆ S, or if S is loosely blocking and S′ is arbitrary,
then S b S′. In this case, the “top” of this ranking (preordering) is occupied by the
maximal blocking coalitions (in loose sense).
These two definitions are on the set of all coalitions. For both the desirability
relation and the blockability relation, there exist versions on the set of all feasible
coalitions (this is why they are often referred to as the desirability relations and the
blockability relations), but we do not enter into details and we just consider the easiest
case.
Ishikawa and Inohara notice that the blockability relation is definitely different
from the desirability relation: being a winning coalition is regarded as the influence
in the desirability relation, whereas the influence is expressed as the capability of a
coalition to block other coalitions to be winning in the blockability relation. Desirability
relation compares coalitions with respect to how close the coalitions are to be winning
coalitions, that is how close the coalitions are to have enough power to completely
control the decision of the situations. The blockability relation compares coalitions
in terms of how much the coalitions can make winning coalitions non winning, that
is, how much the coalitions can make other coalitions not have enough power to
completely control the decision of the situation. Then, it turns out that these relations
are totally different from each other.
Differently from the desirability relation, the blockability relation is always transi-
tive. The authors focus on this point to affirm that the blockability relation is more
appropriate than the desirability relation for the purpose of comparison of influence
of coalitions on group decision-making, then once more the attention is focused on
the power to block versus the power to win in the analysis of a game. They take the
transitivity of the blockability relation as a convenient feature for defining a blocking
power index.
Kitamura and Inohara [56] provide a necessary and sufficient condition for having
a complete blockability relation on a simple game. They prove that given a game
(N,W ) and the blockability relation b on (N,W ), such a relation is complete iff the
simple game is S-unanimous for a coalition S, i.e. iff Wm = {S}. They propose
to employ the S-unanimous simple games to provide a new power index which is
consistent with the blockability relation. Such an index should indicate the power of
each coalition as well as that of each member of N, in spite of the traditional ones,
which are not convenient to compare power of coalitions; this is why we refer to such
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an index as a coalitional power index, as it is a function ψ : 2N → R which assigns
to each coalition a real number that indicates its power. Kitamura and Inohara [57]
propose the blockability index as an example of coalitional power index. It is defined
as
b(S) =
|B(S)|
|W | , (5.1)
where B(S) = {T ∈ W |T \ S /∈ W} is the set of all the winning coalitions that are
blocked by coalition S. The larger the number |B(S)| of winning coalitions that S can
block is, the more blocking power coalition S has as a whole. This index measures
the power of each coalition with respect to how many winning coalitions it can turn
losing by withdrawing. It is also confirmed that the blockability index coincides with
the Banzhaf value except their constant coefficients on oneplayer coalitions, so it can
be seen as an extension of it to evaluate each coalition of parties.
5.4 Mercik: Measuring and Axiomatizing the Power of Veto
In the UNSC, the veto of one of the permanent members on substantive matters does
not allow the proposal passing under any condition. In the Congress of the United
States of America decisions are taken by approval of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives using the straight majority rule in each one of them; the President
is endowed with veto power and he can reject a bill. This situation is much different
from the previous example, as the presidential veto right can be overruled by a 2/3
majorities in both the chambers. The standard definition of veto player is no longer
valid and we have to deal with a bit different situation, as the President does not
belong to all winning coalitions, but he is endowed anyway with a kind of veto right.
Mercik [70] describes the two different situations defining the veto of the first
degree as the one which cannot be overruled, as it happens in the UNSC, and the
veto of the second degree, on the other hand, as the one which can be overruled, as
for the President of the United States.
Similarly to what happens in the United States, in Poland, according to the Con-
stitutional Act, after a bill has been approved by the Sejm (the Polish lower chamber)
is considered by the Senate, which may accept, amend or reject it. If a bill is amended
or rejected by the Senate, then it goes back to the Sejm. The Sejm may, by absolute
majority, reject the Senate’s objection. After that, a bill accepted by the Sejm goes to
the President who signs and declares the bill in the official monitor (gazette). It may
happen that in the case of important state interests or poor quality of constituted law,
the president may reject the bill, using his power of veto. The Sejm may accept the
bill one more time by a majority of 3/5 of votes in the presence of at least half of the
representatives and in this case the President’s veto is overruled and he has to sign
the bill. Differently from the United States case, in Poland any Senate’s objection
can always be rejected.
The two mentioned examples do not represent exceptional cases, but they give an
idea of a very common political tool, the veto of the second degree, that we can find
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in many different political situations.
After defining two different degrees of veto, Mercik poses a question: is blockability
equivalent to veto?
The veto right awarded to one or more players is often taken in the literature as an
example in the study of the blocking coalitions and in the definition of blocking power
indices. Referring to the blockability principle of Ishikawa and Inohara (see Section
5.3), Mercik affirms that it is fulfilled only for veto of the first degree, while veto of
the second degree may not fulfill it, concluding that blockability may be not equivalent
to veto; in particular, blockability principle is stronger than veto.
Mercik [70] proposes to use the Johnston power index [53] to study the problem
of evaluating the power of veto, comparing the power of players with and without the
right of veto. He observes, for example, that using the mentioned index the power of
a permanent member in the UNSC is 103 times the power of a nonpermanent member
(!). Quite intuitively, the right of veto will increase the power of a player in most the
real examples.
A measure of veto power by comparing the power of players with and without veto
is always possible when studying an example of veto of the first degree. The situation
is a bit more complicated when analyzing a case of veto of the second degree, as we
will see just after.
In Mercik [69] we have an evaluation of the power of the members of a legislative
process in Poland, i.e. of the President, the Sejm and the Senate. He analyzes and
evaluate the Johnston power index in three different cases, assuming at first that there
are no party structures (the representatives vote independently) in the Parliament, then
that just the Sejm has a party structure (the representatives vote according to the
party) and finally that the Sejm has still a party structure, but the President favors
one of the opposition parties (the case in which the President and the government
represent the same political faction is not analyzed, as in this case the President would
not veto a bill supported by the government). In the last two examples the power is
evaluated for the parties which are in the government.
In the first case the President of Poland is more than 12 times stronger than the
Sejm as a whole (which is assumed to have a power equal to the sum of the power
of the representatives). The position of the President changes radically introducing
a party structure. The power of the President is decreased deeply, even when he
is attributed with veto. We may say that the power of the President in this case
consists of power of veto, and in this situation the Johnston power index for the
President measures only the power of veto directly.
In the more complex situations of veto of the second degree, strategic thinking
plays a relevant role: veto may become conditional and depending on other decision-
makers. The legislative way a bill goes through the Polish parliamentary system may
be different from time to time (e.g. the Sejm may be in action one, two or three times
depending on the restrictions of the Senate and of the President). The estimation of
veto power is connected with the President only but depends on the power of other
players, which must look ahead and reason back. Mercik proposes to use a strategic
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type power index for the power evaluation, suggesting, for example, the strategic power
index defined by Steunenberg et al. [89]. Employing the results of noncooperative
sequential games in which players decide on their actions at different stages, it allows
players acting strategically integrating actors preferences, as well as the rules of the
decision-making process.
According to the opinion of Mercik, the estimation of veto right, in particular the
one of the second degree, cannot be always done so directly as in the example of
Poland and a new index remains to be defined for complicated games (compound
games), with more general structure. Mercik [71] proposes a possible starting point
for the solution of this open problem: to define a partition structure including the issue
of veto (the first or the second degree) and then to look for the best power index to
apply to this problem. As in the classical literature, he proposes some suitable axioms
that such an index should satisfy. He shows that the Johnston power index does not
look so bad for games with veto (also from an axiomatic point of view), but that it
represents the optimal index for this kind of evaluation has to be discussed and proved
yet.
5.5 Carreras: Protectionism and Blocking Power Indices
In this section we recall two works of Carreras in 2005 [22] and in 2009 [23]. Our work,
provided in the next section, is mainly based on these two articles. The definition of
veto player is the classical one which corresponds to the veto of first degree of the
previous section. In this case, as observed by Mercik, the concepts of veto and of
blockability coincide.
First, we recall the work of Carreras [22] mainly based on the idea of providing a
numerical measure of the agility of the collective decision-making mechanism. Carreras
defines the decisiveness index of the game (N,W ) as
δ(N,W ) =
|W |
2n
(5.2)
where n = |N|. It gives the probability that an abstract proposal will pass in (N,W ),
where each agent i ∈ N has only two options: voting for the proposal (Y) or vot-
ing against it (N), with probability 1/2 (the abstention is allowed, but it counts for
“against”). We remark that the probabilities of the agents are assumed to be inde-
pendent. The motion will pass if and only if the set of agents that vote for Y is a
winning coalition S ∈ W . Obviously 0 < δ(N,W ) < 1 as ∅ /∈ W and N ∈ W . Given
two simple games (N,W ) and (N,W ′) with the same player set, |W | < |W ′| implies
δ(N,W ) < δ(N,W ′). If a game is decisive, then δ(N,W ) = 1/2 independently of
the number of involved players. Since no improper and weak weighted majority game
exists, in this subclass the index 1/2 characterizes the decisive games. Carreras also
proves that when a game is weak and proper, the decisiveness index is smaller than
1/2 and when it is improper and strong the index is greater than 1/2.
The next work of Carreras [23] is about the concept and the role of blocking power
in a simple game and it is drawn near the strictly related idea of veto. In that paper,
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starting from the description of a simple game through the set of winning coalitions,
Carreras specifies that, sometimes, some additional restrictions may decrease the
number of them. He refers to a protecting philosophy which may bring, for example,
to the designation of some veto players and he cites the classical example of the UNSC
already mentioned in this chapter. In this contest, the so called blocking coalitions, i.e.
those coalitions that, even if not winning, are powerful enough to prevent a proposal to
pass, become relevant. We refer now to the definition of decisive winning, conflictive
winning, blocking and strictly losing coalitions given in Section 2.1, as they are the
ones adopted by Carreras; in particular according to him a blocking coalition is a losing
coalition whose complementary is losing too.
Applying the decisiveness index to the dual game (N,W ∗), it is easy to verify that
• δ(N,W ∗) + δ(N,W ) = 1
• δ(N,W ∗)− δ(N,W ) = |Q|−|C|2n
Then, focusing on the dual game, he states that it allows defining an obvious
protectionism index, which Carreras calls the loose protectionism index, based on the
idea of providing a numerical measure of the inertia of any decision-making mechanism;
in formula
δ∗(N,W ) = δ(N,W ∗) = 1− δ(N,W ). (5.3)
It gives the probability that a proposal will not pass in (N,W ), where again each
agent has the options to vote for or against the proposal, with probability 1/2. This
index is suggested as a possible choice to define a collective blocking index for simple
games to measure the blocking capability at collective level, analyzing the game by a
protectionism viewpoint. But as δ∗(N,W ) = 1 − δ(N,W ), Carreras observes that it
does not provide any new information. Analogously, he mentions the idea of defining
an individual blocking index, which he calls the Banzhaf loose blocking power index,
by
β∗i (N,W ) = βi(N,W
∗). (5.4)
The reason why of this possible definition is that Carreras observes that in some
manner the Banzhaf index measures the decisiveness of a game from a local viewpoint
i.e., from the perspective of each player, mainly because of the following result
βi(N,W ) = 2δ(N,W )− 2δ(N−{i},W−{i}), (5.5)
where (N−{i},W−{i}) denotes the residual game that arises when player i leaves, i.e.
the subgame with players set N \ {i}. Unfortunately, neither this choice would bring
any additional information to the study of the structure of the game, as β∗i (N,W ) =
βi(N,W ).
In [23] Carreras aims at defining some blocking indices, both from a collective
and from an individual point of view, i.e. indices that, differently from the classical
power indices which represent the power to win, can represent the power to block and
that can add new information about the game. Starting from the observation that
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when the set of winning coalitions reduces, the set of blocking coalitions necessarily
increases, he conjectures a relation between the two families and the possibility of
defining a game from the set of blocking coalitions. He concludes that a blocking set
Q ⊆ 2N determines univocally a game iff it is separating, i.e. iff for each S ⊆ N, there
exists some T ∈ Q s.t. S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S.
He defines a collective blocking index for simple games, which he calls the strict
protectionism index, as
pi(N,W ) =
|Q|
2n
, (5.6)
in order to represent the power of the collectivity to block. Then, he defines a blocking
swing for player i ∈ N as a pair (S, S \{i}) s.t. S ∈ Q and S \{i} /∈ Q and he call the
Banzhaf strict blocking power index an individual blocking power index for the players
involved defined as
ρi(N,W ) =
ξi(N,W )
2n−1
, (5.7)
where ξi(N,W ) is the number of blocking swings for player i . The strict protectionism
index is clearly somehow close to the definition of decisiveness index, given in Formula
(5.2), as it gives the probability that an abstract proposal will be blocked (instead of
the probability that it will pass, as for the decisiveness index) in (N,W ) where each
agent i ∈ N votes for the proposal (Y) or against it (N) with probability 1/2.
Differently from the indices in (5.3) and in (5.4), these two new indices, pi and ρ,
add information in the description of the game. For example, nonequivalent players
for a power index, as β, can be equivalent for a blocking power index, as ρ, underlining
the natural fact that making a coalition winning by joining the coalition itself is not
equivalent to making a coalition losing by leaving. In view of this, it is interesting
to notice that, somehow, the Banzhaf strict blocking power index and the classical
Banzhaf value have a relation: even if they are different, in the games with high
number of blocking coalitions they can be very close each other and we obtain that
ρi(N,W ) ≈ βi(N,W ) for almost all i ∈ N. The UNSC is an example of a system where
the power to win and the power to block perfectly coincide following the definitions
proposed by Carreras, as ρi(N,W ) = βi(N,W ) for every i ∈ N.
Unfortunately, axiomatic characterizations for pi and ρ are not yet available. Car-
reras proposes also to generalize pi and ρ, in the same way δ and β have been general-
ized in [21] to the α-decisiveness index and the Banzhaf α-index. These new indices
are built starting from the observation that the decisiveness index can be calculated
in terms of the multilinear extension of the game (see Owen [79]) by replacing each
variable with 1/2. Then, this suggests that, in fact, any values of the variables might
make sense and this leads to a new generalized voting model and its corresponding
decisiveness and Banzhaf indices. Thus, by assuming α is the vector which assigns to
each player the probability to be in favor of a law, Carreras defines the α-decisiveness
index and checks that it can be computed by means of the multilinear extension of the
simple game to which it applies. Moreover, the analogue of the relationship between
decisiveness and the Banzhaf value gives rise to a definition of a Banzhaf α-index, and
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its computation in terms of multilinear extension is also provided, always generalizing
the formal case.
5.6 A New Quantitative Index for Evaluating Veto Power
In this section we directly refer to the work of Carreras presented in Section 5.5.
He defined the decisiveness index and the loose protectionism index of a game here
presented in Formula (5.2) and in Formula (5.3) respectively. These indices describe
the game entirely and only the first one has been adopted by Carreras as really useful,
as they both give the same information in the description of the game. However,
starting from this idea, we propose two new indices which are defined for a single
player in order to measure the decisiveness and the protectionism of the game from
the perspective of each player.
Let Wi be the set of winning coalitions including player i , i.e. Wi = {S ∈ W : i ∈
S}. The decisiveness index of player i is defined as
δi(N,W ) =
|Wi |
2n−1
(5.8)
where n = |N|. It gives the probability that a proposal will pass in (N,W ) when we
already know that player i votes in favor of the proposal (Y) and the other players
vote in favor or against with probability 1/2.
Obviously, 0 < δi(N,W ) ≤ 1 as N ∈ Wi . If the outcome A stands for “the proposal
passes” and B for “player i votes in favor”, the index corresponds to the conditional
probability
P (A|B) = P (A ∩ B)
P (B)
Proposition 5.6.1. When i is a veto player, δi(N,W ) = 2δ(N,W )
Proof. Writing the conditional probability as P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)P (B) and considering
that P (B) = 1/2, P (A|B) = δi(N,W ) and P (A) = δ(N,W ), we obtain δi(N,W ) =
2P (B|A)δ(N,W ). When i is a veto player P (B|A) = 1 then δi(N,W ) = 2δ(N,W ).
The loose protectionism index of player i is defined as
δ∗i (N,W ) =
2n−1 − |W |+ |Wi |
2n−1
= 1− 2δ(N,W ) + δi(N,W ). (5.9)
It defines the probability that a proposal does not pass in (N,W ) when we know that
player i votes against the proposal (N) and the others vote in favor or against with
probability 1/2.
Obviously, 0 < δ∗i (N,W ) ≤ 1 as ∅ /∈ W . The numerator counts the number of
losing coalitions which do not include player i , i.e. the number of coalitions without
player i voting in favor of the proposal but not being able to make it approved.
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We may observe that player i is a dictator iff δi(N,W ) = 1 and is of veto iff
δ∗i (N,W ) = 1. The indices δi(N,W ) and δ
∗
i (N,W ) are strictly related and this relation
depends on the decisiveness index of the game. In particular
• if the game is weak and proper, as δ(N,W ) < 1/2, we get that δ∗i (N,W ) >
δi(N,W ) for each i ∈ N;
• if the game is strong and improper, by duality δ(N,W ) > 1/2 and δ∗i (N,W ) <
δi(N,W ) for each i ∈ N;
• if the game is decisive, then a player is of veto (δ∗i (N,W ) = 1) iff it is a dictator
(δi(N,W ) = 1), in general when the game is decisive, δi(N,W ) = δ∗i (N,W ) for
each i ∈ N. In a weighted majority game, as there are no weak and improper
games, we are always able to say if the players will have a higher power or a
higher power of veto, or if they are equivalent.
The two indices are also directly related as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.6.2. δ∗i (N,W ) = δi(N,W
∗), for every i ∈ N.
Proof. We have that δi(N,W ∗) =
|W ∗i |
2n−1 and δ
∗
i (N,W ) =
2n−1−|W |+|Wi |
2n−1 .
Let Di = {S ∈ D : i ∈ S}, Ci = {S ∈ C : i ∈ S}, Qi = {S ∈ Q : i ∈ S} and
Pi = {S ∈ P : i ∈ S}. We want to show that
2n−1 − |W |+ |Wi | = |W ∗i |
i.e.
|Di |+ |Ci |+ |Qi |+ |Pi | − |D| − |C|+ |Di |+ |Ci | = |Di |+ |Qi |
|Di |+ 2|Ci |+ |Pi | = |D|+ |C|
and this is true as |Di |+ |Pi | = |D| and 2|Ci | = |C|. In fact
|Di |+ |Pi | = |{S ∈ W, i ∈ S : N \ S /∈ W}|+ |{S /∈ W, i ∈ S : N \ S ∈ W}|
= |{S ∈ W : N \ S /∈ W}| = |D|
and
|Ci | = |{S ∈ W, i ∈ S : N\S ∈ W}| = |{S ∈ W, i /∈ S : N\S ∈ W}| = |C\Ci | = |C|−|Ci |
Proposition 5.6.2 gives the possibility of defining the loose protectionism index of
player i simply as the decisiveness index of player i evaluated on the dual game.
As observed by Carreras [22], the Banzhaf index [12] also measures the decisive-
ness of a game from the perspective of each player. The basic relationship between
the decisiveness index and the Banzhaf index in Formula (5.5) suggests us to look
for a possible relation between the Banzhaf index and the indices defined in (5.8) and
(5.9). When i ∈ N is a veto player, as Carreras noticed βi(N,W ) = 2δ(N,W ), then
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by Proposition 5.6.1 we simply get that when i is a veto player, βi(N,W ) = δi(N,W ).
The indices in (5.8) and (5.9) are quantitative indices and we adopt them as a
measure to evaluate the power of a player in making a proposal been accepted (δi) or
rejected (δ∗i ).
In Example 5.6.1 we compute the previous indices for a simple theoretical situation.
For sake of completeness, we add the Banzhaf strict blocking power index in Formula
(5.7) and the Johnston index in Formula (2.6), J, as suggested by Mercik [70]. The
comparison is carried out using the ratios of the indices among the players, as not all
the indices sum up to one.
Example 5.6.1. Consider the simple weighted majority situation [6; 2, 3, 5] represent-
ing a Parliament with only three parties, then N = {1, 2, 3}. The winning coalitions
are {1, 3}, {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3}.
The decisiveness index of the game is
δ(N,W ) =
3
8
and the loose protectionism index is
δ∗(N,W ) =
5
8
.
We evaluate now the decisiveness index and the loose protectionism index of the
parties
δ1(N,W ) =
1
2 δ2(N,W ) =
1
2 δ3(N,W ) =
3
4
δ∗1(N,W ) =
3
4 δ
∗
2(N,W ) =
3
4 δ
∗
3(N,W ) = 1
We observe that player 1 has full veto power being a veto player, while no player is a
dictator. This is an example of a weak and proper game, then the loose protectionism
indices of the players are greater than their decisiveness indices.
Evaluating now the Banzhaf strict protectionism index and the Johnston index, we
obtain
ρ1(N,W ) =
1
4 ρ2(N,W ) =
1
4 ρ3(N,W ) =
1
4
J1(N,W ) =
1
6 J2(N,W ) =
1
6 J3(N,W ) =
2
3
The Banzhaf strict protectionism index assigns the same power of blocking to every
party, in particular also to party 3, which is a veto player. The Johnston index assigns
to party 3 four times the power given to the others, while for our index of veto it has
only four thirds of the power of the other parties.
The sum of the veto power of the agents may be lower than 1, but this requires
that there is a large number of winning coalitions, and consequently a small number of
blocking coalitions. A simple situation is represented by a restricted committee that
have to decide which proposal may be admitted to a large assembly examination (e.g.
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a parliamentary commission that have to decide which laws can be discussed by the
Parliament). Usually, a very low majority is required, just to avoid to waste time on
proposals that are of no interest for anybody. If we suppose that the committee is
formed by 7 representatives and it is necessary that at least two of them vote in favor
of discussing it we have that the blocking coalitions are those of 6 or 7 players. So
the veto power of each person is 7/64 and the total is 49/64.
5.7 The New Indices as a Measure of “Success”
We now introduce some basic notions which are behind the definition of voting power
in order to apply them to the two new indices introduced in the previous section. We
initially refer to the work of Laruelle and Valenciano [58], in which the authors propose
a simple model for measuring success or decisiveness in voting situations. We start by
the following two definitions ex post, i.e. after a decision is made. Once a decision is
taken, if S is the set of players who voted in favor of the proposal (Y):
• voter i is said to have been successful if the decision coincides with voter i ’s
vote, that is, iff
(i ∈ S ∈ W ) or (i /∈ S /∈ W );
• voter i is said to have been decisive if voter i was successful and i ’s vote was
critical for it, that is, iff
(i ∈ S ∈ W and S \ {i} /∈ W ) or (i /∈ S /∈ W and S ∪ {i} ∈ W ).
In order to give the analogous definition ex post, it is necessary to make an estimation
of the likelihood of different vote configurations from the available information. We
assume that for any coalition S we know, or at least have an estimate of, p(S), i.e. the
probability that S is the set of players in favor of a proposal and N \S the set against
it. We can represent any such probability distribution by a function p : 2N → R. Of
course, 0 ≤ p(S) ≤ 1 for each S ⊆ N and ∑S⊆N p(S) = 1.
Let (N,W ) be a voting game and p the probability distribution over 2N :
• voter i ’s (ex ante) success is the probability that i is successful
Ωi(W, p) = P (i is successful) =
∑
S:i∈S∈W
p(S) +
∑
S:i /∈S/∈W
p(S);
• voter i ’s (ex ante) decisiveness is the probability that i is decisive
Φi(W, p) = P (i is decisive) =
∑
S:i∈S∈W, S\{i}/∈W
p(S) +
∑
S:i /∈S/∈W, S∪{i}∈W
p(S).
If we assume that voter i is sure to vote in favor (or against) the proposal, the
conditional probabilities of success and decisiveness can be evaluated. In particular,
denoting
γi(p) = P (i votes yes (Y)) =
∑
S:i∈S
p(S),
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voter i ’s conditional probability of being decisive given that voter i votes in favor of
the proposal is given by
Φi+i (W, p) = P (i is decisive |i votes yes (Y)) =
∑
S:i∈S∈W, S\{i}/∈W p(S)
γi(p)
,
voter i ’s conditional probability of being decisive given that voter i votes against
proposal is given by
Φi−i (W, p) = P (i is decisive |i votes no (N)) =
∑
S:i /∈S/∈W, S∪{i}∈W p(S)
1− γi(p) ,
voter i ’s conditional probability of being successful given that voter i votes in favor of
the proposal is given by
Ωi+i (W, p) = P (i is successful |i votes yes (Y)) =
∑
S:i∈S∈W p(S)
γi(p)
,
and voter i ’s conditional probability of being successful given that voter i votes against
the proposal is given by
Ωi−i (W, p) = P (i is successful |i votes no (N)) =
∑
S:i /∈S/∈W p(S)
1− γi(p) .
We can now consider as equally probable all the configurations of votes, then we
assume that the probability is given by
p∗(S) =
1
2n
∀S ⊆ N.
That is equivalent to the assumption that each voter, independently from the others,
will vote yes (Y) with probability 12 . This extreme case, which we have adopted also
in the previous section, in the opinion of Laruelle and Valenciano makes sense when
the objective is not to assess a particular voting situation, but the voting rule itself.
Then, the authors show that some power indices can be seen as the particularization
of some of the measures introduced in their paper, in particular the Banzhaf value can
be seen as
βi(W ) =
number of winning coalitions in which i is decisive
total number of coalitions containing i
.
As a coalition containing i means a coalition in which i votes yes, it can be easily seen
that βi(W ) = Φ
i+
i (W, p
∗). In particular, the authors show that
βi(W ) = Φ
i+
i (W, p
∗) = Φi−i (W, p
∗) = Φi(W, p∗). (5.10)
Now, we add the observation that the Banzhaf loose blocking power index can be seen
as
β∗i (W ) =
number of losing coalition in which i is decisive
total number of coalitions non containing i
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and then
β∗i (W ) = Φ
i−
i (W, p
∗). (5.11)
As a direct consequence of (5.10) and (5.11), the Banzhaf value and the Banzhaf
loose blocking power index, defined in (2.3) and in (5.4), provide always the same
measure of power, as it has already been shown in Section 5.5.
Now, we want to point out that also the decisiveness index of player i and the
loose protectionism index of player i , defined in (5.8) and (5.9) respectively, can be
seen as the particularization of some of the previous measures, in particular
δi(N,W ) = Ω
i+
i (W, p) (5.12)
and
δ∗i (N,W ) = Ω
i−
i (W, p). (5.13)
As Ωi+i 6= Ωi−i , the two indices, as we have already seen, do not coincide and they give
different information about the game.
5.8 A Bayesian Model
We may represent the situation through a noncooperative game, at first using its
strategic form and then giving also an idea of its extensive form. Differently from
the usual model of a voting game, we are assuming now that the agents cannot
make binding agreements, as we are dealing with a noncooperative model. A game in
strategic form consists of a 3-tuple < N, (Ai), (%i) > where
i N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players;
ii for each player i ∈ N a nonempty set Ai (the set of strategies available to player
i);
iii for each player i ∈ N a preference relation %i on A = ×j∈NAj (the preference
relation of player i).
A Nash equilibrium of a game in strategic form < N, (Ai), (%i) > is a profile a∗ ∈ A
of strategies with the property that for every player i ∈ N we have
(a∗−i , a
∗
i ) %i (a∗−i , ai) ∀ai ∈ Ai ,
where a−i are the strategies of the players in N \ i . Then, in a Nash equilibrium no
player can profitably deviate, given the strategies of the other players: this is what
Nash defines an equilibrium point in Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games [75] and
it is the most widely used solution for noncooperative games.
In this section we present a bayesian model, following the idea of Harsanyi ([45],
[46] and [47]) of a noncooperative game in which the players do not have complete
information of the game itself. This model is closely related to that of a game in
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strategic form, and so its famous solution concept: the Bayesian equilibrium (or Nash
equilibrium of a Bayesian game). Through this model we propose a noncooperative
interpretation of the two indices defined in Section 5.6 and we give the possibility
of extending the model to the situation in which the agents do not vote in favor or
against a proposal with probability 1/2, but with a different probability distribution.
The lacking of information due to the fact that the agents can predict the preferences
and, consequently, the behavior of the other players, but they cannot be sure about
it and the fact that they can only evaluate an expected payoff, trying to maximize
it, suggested us the possibility to read the problem through a game with incomplete
information.
A game with incomplete information played by bayesian players, or simply a Bayesian
game, is a 5-tuple (N, {Ci}i∈N , {Ti}i∈N , {pik}i∈N, k∈Ti , {ui}i∈N) where
i N is the set of players;
ii Ci is the set of the actions of player i ;
iii Ti is the set of types of player i ;
iv pik is the probability of player i of being of type k , with k ∈ Ti ,
∑
k∈Ti pik = 1;
v ui :
∏
j∈N Cj ×
∏
j∈N Tj → R is the utility function of player i .
A pure strategy for player i is a function si : Ti → Ci and Σi is the set of all the pure
strategies of i . A mixed strategy for player i is a function σi : Ci × Ti → [0, 1] with∑
c∈Ci σi(c, t) = 1 for each t ∈ Ti .
In a Bayesian equilibrium each player chooses the best action available to him given
the signal that he receives and his belief about the state and the other players’ actions
that he deduces from the signal.
In Example 5.6.1, N = {1, 2, 3} is the set of players, i.e. the parties of the
Parliament. Adopting a noncooperative approach, we assume that the parties, instead
of cooperating, vote independently. Each one has two choices: voting yes (Y) or voting
no (N), then Ci = {Y, N} for each i ∈ N. The types of the parties can be identified
with the ideological position: being in favor of the proposal (P) or in favor of the
status quo (Q), then Ti = {P,Q} for each i ∈ N. A given probability is assigned to
the types of the players, in our model equal to 1/2, then pik = 1/2 for each i ∈ N,
k ∈ Ti . These probabilities may represent, more in general, the prediction each type
of each player does on the possibility of the other players of being of a certain type,
but we take a simplified situation in which they all are equal; in our example, every
voter knows that every other player can be of type P or Q with probability 1/2. The
outcome of the game is given by “the law is approved”, if the parties which voted Y
have total number of seats greater than or equal to the majority quota, “the law is
not approved” otherwise. The payoff of each party is 1 if it is of type P and the law
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is approved or if it is of type Q and the law is not approved, 0 otherwise. Formally
ui(s1, . . . , sn) =

1 if Ti = P and
∑
j∈N:sj (Tj )=Y wj ≥ q
1 if Ti = Q and
∑
j∈N:sj (Tj )=Y wj < q
0 otherwise
In Table 5.2 we represent the game in strategic form, where the payoffs of the parties
are shown in the 8 different configurations, starting from when they are all of type P,
in favor of the proposal, finishing with the case of when they are all of type Q, in favor
of the status quo. In every situation, that we call state of nature, we assume that
party 1 chooses the row, party 2 the column and party 3 the matrix. The first choice
for all of them corresponds to voting Y, the second one to voting N. Each player has
a utility of 1 when the outcome is consistent with the type of the player who has been
selected, 0 otherwise.
(1P , 2P , 3P )
(
(1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0)
) (
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
)
(1P , 2P , 3Q)
(
(1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0)
(1, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1)
) (
(0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1)
)
(1P , 2Q, 3P )
(
(1, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1)
(1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0)
) (
(0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0)
(0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0)
)
(1P , 2Q, 3Q)
(
(1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1)
) (
(0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1)
(0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1)
)
(1Q, 2P , 3P )
(
(0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1)
(0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0)
) (
(1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0)
)
(1Q, 2P , 3Q)
(
(0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0)
(0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 1)
) (
(1, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1)
(1, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1)
)
(1Q, 2Q, 3P )
(
(0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0)
) (
(1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0)
(1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0)
)
(1Q, 2Q, 3Q)
(
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1)
) (
(1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1)
)
Table 5.2: Strategic form of the game
In order to show the complexity of the problem, we represent the situation in extensive
form in Figure 5.1, where the black dots represent the choices of the nature which
selects the type of each party with probability 1/2. Then each player (the white dots)
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has to take its own decision, selecting an action between Y and N, finally one of the
64 outcomes is selected.
Every party knows its own type, but not the types of the other two parties. As it
gives probability 1/2 to every type of the other parties, it assigns probability 1/4 to be
in a given state of nature. If party 1, for example, is of type P, it will give probability
1/4 to each one of the first four states of nature shown in Table 5.2. Assuming that
party 2 will play (p, 1−p) and party 3 (q, 1−q), the expected payoff for party 1 when
it plays Y is
1
4
[pq + (1− p)q] + 1
4
[pq + (1− p)q] + 1
4
[pq + (1− p)q] + 1
4
[pq + (1− p)q] = q
and when it plays N is
1
4
[pq] +
1
4
[pq] +
1
4
[pq] +
1
4
[pq] = pq
then the best choice for party 1 of type P is to play (t, 1− t) with t = 1 if p < 1 and
t ∈ [0, 1] if p = 1.
Writing the best reply for every type of every player, we obtain the obvious result
that the optimal strategy for the players is to choose Y if they are of type P and N if
they are of type Q. This is the Bayesian pure equilibrium of the game.
The interest of the result is that, when the probabilities of the types are all equal
to 1/2, playing the equilibrium strategy every party of type P can obtain an expected
utility equal to its decisiveness index and every party of type Q an expected utility
equal to its loose protectionism index.
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Figure 5.1: Extensive form of the game
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6.1 Introduction
The second part of this thesis deals with a different branch of Game Theory applied
to voting systems. We spent the previous three chapters evaluating the power share
in a Parliament. Now we study a foregoing step of a democracy structure: we try to
evaluate the “goodness” of an electoral system in providing a Parliament starting from
the electors’ preferences expressed during an election.
Electoral systems and their features are widely studied in literature. We just
mention the contributions on electoral systems by Brams and Fishburn [20], Hołubiec
and Mercik [50], Nurmi [76] and Lijphart [60]. At first sight the problem of choosing
the best electoral system for a Parliament cannot be solved: Arrow’s theorem [9] in
1950 and McKelvey’s theorem [68] in 1976 excluded the very possibility of finding out
the optimal rule, but no theorem prohibits finding out a criterion to establish whether
a rule is better or worse than another. Moreover, we may remark that already in 1952
May’s Theorem [66] disqualifies the theorem of Arrow, as it affirms that in some
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particular situations (but the result can be generalized) the majority rule respects all
the requirements of Arrow’s theorem, but transitivity. This is not a practical problem
as intransitivity is extremely rare in parliamentary elections.
The choice of the “best” Parliament may be affected by a lot of facets of the
political process, but two of them may be considered more relevant than the others:
representativeness (R) that depends on the capacity of the system in representing
electors’ preferences and governability (G) that measures the effect on the efficiency
of the resulting government. In the 20th century, the wide appearance of proportional
systems was one of the reasons for the development of various methods for measuring
the quality of electoral systems, mainly due to evaluate the representativeness, often
called proportionality (or, evaluating the lack of proportionality, called disproportional-
ity), of a Parliament. In 1982 Balinski and Young [11] gained one of the main results:
they proved the impossibility of constructing a proportional system that allocates
seats in an exactly proportional way. The problems regarding proportional systems
are mainly due to two reasons: the first is that the so-called proportional systems
often introduce some modifications in order to enhance other good features, in primis
the governability, excluding the smallest parties, via a threshold, and/or strengthening
the largest parties, via a majority prize; the second is that even with a perfect pro-
portional system it is necessary to assign an integer number of seats through some
rounding methods, we will refer to the problem of the distribution of the rests as the
apportionment problem. The impossibility of creating an ideal proportional electoral
system forced researchers to define quantitative indices that would reflect the degree
to which the system satisfies certain conditions. Such indices contain quantitative
information and allow researchers to conduct empirical research and compare various
electoral systems. Then proportionality and the related problem of apportionment be-
came a largely studied topic in the last years. More specific on proportionality are the
papers by Gallagher [38] and Monroe [72] and the analysis of apportionment methods
by Gambarelli and Palestini [41].
In this chapter we mainly focus on the work of Karpov [55], who studied the
properties of some of the most famous disproportionality indices (plus some modifi-
cations), which are presented and axiomatically analyzed; then, they are applied to
four electoral sessions in Russia for studying the features of these indices when the
number of parties varies. We complete his analysis introducing the indices proposed by
Ortona [34], Fragnelli [32] and Gambarelli and Biella [40]. In particular, the last two
indices account the issue of power for measuring the disproportionality. In our mind,
the power, i.e. the influence of each party on the decision of passing a law, should
play a more relevant role in evaluating the characteristics of a Parliament, including
the proportionality. As we point out in Section 6.5 with suitably designed academic
examples, it is possible that an apparently unfair distribution of seats w.r.t. votes
may provide the parties the same power of their voters, so we can conclude that the
voting body is well represented by the Parliament if the representativeness (the dis-
proportionality) is measured by an index accounting the issue of power. In this case,
the classical indices listed by Karpov assign a high level of disproportionality to the
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system.
Proportional systems are largely adopted all over the world, so it may be difficult
the idea to accept an electoral system entirely based on the issue of power. Because
of that, in the last part of this chapter we propose to use this method to solve only the
problem of the apportionment and not the entire problem of assigning the total amount
of seats; in this way we use the issue of power keeping the idea of a proportional based
allocation.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 6.2 we recall the disproportionality
indices listed by Karpov; in Section 6.3 we present the three added indices; Section
6.4 presents the axioms a good index, according to Karpov, should satisfies, provides
the result of Karpov on the properties those indices satisfy and add the analysis on
the three new indices. In Section 6.5 we present two academic examples to show
the relevance of the issue of power; Section 6.6 contains the value assigned by the
three indices to the Russian electoral sessions used by Karpov and a discussion on the
comparison with the indices in [55]; Section 6.7 illustrates the idea of using the issue
of power for building a new apportionment rule .
6.2 Measurement of Disproportionality in Proportional Sys-
tems
Many indices of disproportionality have been constructed; some of them were devel-
oped for studying particular electoral systems, while others were adapted from other
areas of science. Thus, there was and there is no agreement concerning what indices
are better in a particular situation. In his work, Karpov [55] studies the properties of
some of these disproportionality indices. He considers a proportional election where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of parties participating, with n = |N|. Let (V1, . . . , Vn) be
the vector of votes and (S1, . . . , Sn) be the vector of seats each party receives. Then∑n
i=1 Vi = V and
∑n
i=1 Si = S. We underline that these indices are mainly defined for
a proportional election, but it is possible to adopt them to evaluate the proportionality
of any election, even one based on a majoritarian system. The purpose of the election
is to represent voters’ preferences as closely as possible. According to the principle
one person - one vote, each ballot should have “equal force” in the sense of the share
of seats in the Parliament:
Si
Vi
=
S
V
∀i = 1, . . . , n (6.1)
Let vi = Vi/V and si = Si/S be the vote and seat shares that party i receives and
yi = Si/Vi the representation of party i . Party i is overrepresented when yi > S/V
and party i is underrepresented when the opposite inequality holds. We require that
the apportionment respects the property of monotonicity, i.e. if v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn, then
s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sn. The ideal case is when each vote has equal force and each party
obtains a share of seats equal to the share of votes, then vi = si for each i = 1 . . . n.
The deviation from the exact equality is not only a mathematical problem, but also
a political one, because it is a distortion of citizens’ true preferences. As already
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said, a real political system cannot achieve equality, first of all because the number
of seats is an integer. Disproportionality indices measure the deviation between the
real assignment and the exact one; we list now the various approaches for measuring
the quality of an electoral system which have been analyzed by Karpov, divided into
several groups.
6.2.1 Absolute Deviation Indices
These indices characterize apportionment by means of absolute deviations between
vote share and seat share. Indices are equal to zero if and only if vi = si for each
party: this corresponds to the ideal representation.
• The Maximum Deviation index shows the size of distortion of the most inaccu-
rately represented party,
MD = maxi=1...n|si − vi |.
• The Rae index is the arithmetic mean of absolute deviations,
IRae =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|si − vi |.
It has a clear interpretation: it is the average of the deviation of the parties from
the exact representation.
• The Loosmore-Hanby index seems to be similar to the Rae index, but it has
a completely different meaning. The value of the Loosmore-Hanby index gives
the total excess of seat shares of overrepresented parties over the exact quota
and the total shortage accruing to other parties,
ILH =
1
2
n∑
i=1
|si − vi |.
• The Grofman index implies calculating the mean of absolute deviations, but
their sum is divided by the effective number of parties E rather than by the total
number of parties,
IGr =
1
E
n∑
i=1
|si − vi |,
where E =
(∑n
i=1 v
2
i
)−1.
• The Lijphart index is calculated in the same way as the Rae index, but only the
two largest parties are considered,
IL =
|sk − vk |+ |sh − vh|
2
,
where k and h are the two largest parties. Since the largest parties usually have
the most significant deviations from their exact quota, this measure can be used
to evaluate the disproportionality of the whole system.
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6.2.2 Quadratic Indices
Quadratic indices can be used to compare distributions with an equal sum of absolute
deviations.
• The Gallagher index, often called the least squares index, has a different sensitiv-
ity to large and small deviations between vote and seat shares. Small differences
have less influence on the index than big ones, which increase the index signifi-
cantly,
Lsq =
√√√√1
2
n∑
i=1
(si − vi)2.
• The Monroe index is a small modification of the Gallagher index,
IM =
√∑n
i=1(si − vi)2
1 +
∑n
i=1 v
2
i
,
The sum of the squares of vote shares characterizes the number of parties. The
denominator decreases as the number of parties increases.
• The Gatev index is higher when parties are approximately equal in size than if
there is significant inequality between parties or if there is a higher number of
parties. Thus, this index is more sensitive to small parties than the Gallagher
index,
IGa =
√∑n
i=1(si − vi)2∑n
i=1(s
2
i + v
2
i )
.
• The Ryabtsev index insignificantly differs from the Gatev index, and it has lower
values,
IR =
√∑n
i=1(si − vi)2∑n
i=1(si + vi)
2
.
• The Szalai index is used in time-use research (the study dedicated to knowing
how people allocate their time during an average day) for comparing activity
profiles,
IS =
√√√√∑ni=1 ( si−visi+vi )2
n
.
6.2.3 Aleskerov-Platonov Index
• The Aleskerov-Platonov index is calculated only for overrepresented parties:
R =
1
k
k∑
i=1
si
vi
.
When some parties are not represented, the other parties will obtain on average
more than one percent of seats for each percent of votes. This index shows the
average excess of seat share over the vote share for overrepresented parties.
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6.2.4 Inequality Indices
The following indices are borrow from welfare economics, which faced the problem
of measuring inequality, a problem that is quite similar to the problem of measuring
disproportionality.
• The Gini index is calculated using the Lorenz curve. The curve passes through
the points with cumulative shares of the income. If wealth is distributed equally
among individuals, then the curve is a straight line. If not, the curve will lie
under this line and be convex. The cumulative shares of electoral income are
calculated by the following formula:
Th =
∑h
i=1
si
vi∑n
j=1
sj
vj
where s1v1 , . . . ,
sn
vn
are given in increasing order. The Gini index(G) is the ratio of
the area between the Lorenz curve and the perfect equality line to the area of
the triangle under the straight line.
• The Atkinson index is defined as
A = 1−
[
n∑
i=1
vi
(
si
vi
)1−] 11−
,
where  characterizes the attitude of a society to inequality: a negative attitude
to inequality is strengthened by an increase in .
• The Generalized entropy is given by the following formula:
GE =
1
α2 − α
[
n∑
i=1
vi
(
si
vi
)α
− 1
]
,
where varying the value of the parameter α we have a class of indices with
similar properties
6.2.5 Objective Functions
For each apportionment method, an objective function can be defined such that its
optimization gives the best seat allocation. This very function can be used to measure
disproportionality.
• The d’Hondt index equals the maximum excess of seat share over vote share,
Ho = maxi=1...n
si
vi
.
• The Sainte-Lague index is a weighted sum of squares of relative deviation,
SL =
n∑
i=1
vi ·
(
si
vi
− 1
)2
.
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6.3 The Added Indices of Disproportionality
For completing the analysis of the disproportionality indices and of their properties,
we add three indices: the Ortona index, the Fragnelli index and the Gambarelli-Biella
index. The first two ones are defined as representativeness indices, but both of them
are obtained as one minus a disproportionality index, so we present them as dispro-
portionality indices, for consistency with the paper of Karpov.
• The Ortona index was proposed in [34] and it is based on the difference between
seats assigned by a given electoral system and seats assigned by a perfect pro-
portional system, PP, i.e. supposing a unique nation-wide proportional district
and assigning the rest to the largest decimals. The idea is to avoid combining
votes and seats as most of the indices of disproportionality commonly do, taking
SPPi as the best approximation of Vi . The formula is:
r =
∑n
i=1 |Si − SPPi |∑n
i=1 |Sui − SPPi |
(6.2)
where Si is the number of seats of party i with the system under consideration,
SPPi is the number of seats of party i with the perfect proportional system and
Sui is the total number of seats for the relative majority party according to the
seat share and 0 otherwise.
The index reads as follows. For the sum at the numerator, we assume that the
disproportionality is minimal under perfect proportionality rule. Hence, the loss
of disproportionality incurred by party i is the (absolute) difference between the
seats actually obtained and those it would get under PP. Summing this absolute
difference across all the parties we obtain the total disproportionality. The sum
at the denominator is introduced to normalize this value. It is the maximum
possible disproportionality obtained when the relative majority party, according
to the selected system, takes all the seats instead of just its quota. Remembering
that S is the total number of seats let, without loss of generality, party 1 be the
relative majority party; then
∑n
i=1 |Sui −SPPi | = |Su1−SPP1 |+
∑n
i=2 |Sui −SPPi | =
S − SPP1 +
∑
i=2 | − SPPi | = 2(S − SPP1 ).
The ratio of the sums is a disproportionality index, normalized in the range [0, 1].
Note that this index cannot be employed starting from real-world votes in a
nonproportional system, due to strategic voting. However, some ingenuity could
allow for using it starting from survey data.
• The Fragnelli index was introduced in [32]. We switch our attention to the
power of the parties, following the idea that it plays a relevant role in evaluating
the representativeness of a Parliament, and look for the relationship among the
power they have according to the distribution of votes and according to the
distribution of seats.
78 Chapter 6. Proportionality and the “Best” Electoral System
In order to deal with the concept of power, starting from the vote share (v1, . . . , vn)
and the seat share (s1, . . . , sn), we define two simple games (N,w) and (N, u),
where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of parties and w and u are the two character-
istic functions w, u : 2N → [0, 1] respectively defined by the following weighted
majority situations [q′; v1, . . . , vn] and [q′′; s1, . . . , sn], where q′ =
⌊
V
2 + 1
⌋
/V
and q′′ =
⌊
S
2 + 1
⌋
/S; then w is valued 1 for the winning coalitions of parties,
i.e. coalitions with a total vote share greater than 0.5, sufficient to pass a law,
and 0 for the loosing coalitions; similarly for the function u referred to the seat
share.
This disproportionality index measures the distance of the distribution of power
on the votes and on the seats, i.e.
∑
i∈N |ψi(w)−ψi(u)|. It is normalized, simply
dividing
∑
i∈N |ψi(w) − ψi(u)| by 2, as in the worst case the two distributions
of power may assign complementary values 1. So, we have:
rΩ =
∑
i∈N |ψi(w)− ψi(u)|
2
. (6.3)
The distance is zero when the power of each party is identical in the two dis-
tributions. The idea is that a good system should provide a Parliament which
respects the share of power given by the electors’ votes. The principle one per-
son - one vote, according to which each ballot should have “equal force” in the
sense of the share of seats in the Parliament, it is now replaced by the principle
that each ballot should have “equal power”.
• The last index, proposed in [40], is Gambarelli-Biella index. The Fragnelli index
is not the first case in which power is used for evaluating representativeness
(or disproportionality). In fact, Gambarelli-Biella index, which has been defined
some years before, is a combination of the traditional approach, which considers
vote and seat shares, with the idea of measuring the distance of the distributions
of power related to the votes and to the seats. It is given by:
∆ = max
i∈N
{|vi − si |, |ψi(w)− ψi(u)|} (6.4)
Remark 6.3.1. Note that rΩ is based on norm 1, while ∆ is based on norm ∞, so it
is possible to define other indices based on other norms.
6.4 Axiomatic Approach
Disproportionality indices must have certain properties. We refer now to the following
four principles listed by Karpov
1. Anonymity. Any permutation of party labels does not change the value of the
index.
1 Two vectors are complementary when each nonzero component in a vector corresponds to a
zero component in the other vector.
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2. Principle of transfers. If we transfer seats from an overrepresented party to an
underrepresented party the value of the index should not increase.
3. Independence from split. Suppose there are many parties with equal vote and
seat shares, and these parties are grouped into one. If the value of the index
calculated for all the parties in the group is equal to the value of the index for
the group considered as a whole, then the property of independence from split
holds.
4. Scale invariance. The index should not depend on any proportional change in
the number of votes or seats in the parliament.
In Table 6.1 we summarize the analysis of Karpov about the properties each index
satisfies. The “+” sign means that the index satisfies the property, the “-” sign that
it does not. All the indices satisfy property 1 and 4 (then the two properties are not
included in the table).
Indices Principle of transfers Independence from split
Maximum deviation + −
Rae index + −
LH index + +
Grofman index + −
Lijphart index + −
Gallagher index + −
Monroe index + −
Gatev index − +
Ryabtsev index − +
Szalai index − +
Aleskerov-Platanov index + +
Gini index + +
Atkinson index + +
Generalized entropy + +
D’Hondt index + +
Sainte-Lague index + +
Table 6.1: Axiomatic properties of the indices
We add now in Table 6.2 the analysis of the properties that the three indices we
presented in Section 6.3 satisfy. They all satisfy property 1 and 4 as the previous ones.
The reason why the two disproportionality indices based on power do not respect
Property 2 and 3 is due to the fact that the indices of power, in general, do not respect
the similar corresponding properties. Karpov underlines the fact that violation of
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Indices Principle of transfers Independence from split
Ortona + +
Fragnelli − −
Gambarelli-Biella − −
Table 6.2: Axiomatic properties of the added indices
property 3 means that the index depends on the number of parties. In our analysis, the
violation of this property is more related to a variation of the distribution of the power
inside a Parliament; analogously, the transfer of seats from an overrepresented party
to an underrepresented one (Property 2), on the one hand, may have a positive effect
on the distribution of seats w.r.t. to votes, but on the other hand may dramatically
change the power distributions.
6.5 Academic Examples
The situations we are going to analyze, even if they are not very realistic, mainly for
the small number of seats and the distribution of votes, are useful to show how the
indices based on power focus on a totally different point, compared with the traditional
ones. Parliaments which are very good, evaluated by the classical indices, can be very
bad from the point of view of representing the power and vice versa. In our analysis we
refer to the the disproportionality indices listed by Karpov and here recalled in Section
6.2 and to the three ones we added in Section 6.3. We decide not to take into account
the indices which require to assign a particular parameter, as in an academic situation
this is not possible. This does not affect our analysis, as the remaining indices are
sufficient in number to perform a comparison with the three added indices.
The indices have different ranges of values and this does not allow for a cross-
analysis, but the following situations are designed in such a way that all the above-
mentioned indices and the index by Ortona produce a result in contrast with the two
power-based indices, and to underline this difference is the aim of this analysis. For
computing the last two indices we have to decide which power index to use. Between
all the indices we listed in Section 2.2.2, we chose two of the most popular ones,
the Shapley-Shubik index and the Public Good index. Our choice depends on their
different behavior; in fact, the former has the local monotonicity property, so that it
assigns larger power to parties with greater number of seats, while the latter does not
respect monotonicity and the difference of power are often very small w.r.t other non
monotonic indices (see Hollera and Napel [49]).
Example 6.5.1. We start revisiting the classical situation in Example 1 in [32]. Three
parties A,B, C receive a percentage of votes of 49.5%, 48.5%, 2.0%, respectively and
6 seats have to be assigned. We consider three different seats assignments:
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A B C
sPP 3 3 0
s 3 2 1
sPO 2 2 2
Table 6.3: Seat distribution for academic Example 6.5.1
sPP assigns the seats according to the perfect proportional system; s guarantees
one seat to party C, with the consequence that party A receives one seat more than
party B; finally, sPO (PO after Power Oriented) guarantees a distribution of power
on the seat share equal to the distribution of power on the vote share, even if it does
not seem as reasonable as the other two.
Computing the abovementioned disproportionality indices in Example 6.5.1 we
obtain the following table:
MD ILH IL Lsq G IRae IGr IM IGa IR IS SL R Ho
sPP 0.020 0.020 0.010 0.018 0.020 0.013 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.018 0.577 0.021 1.021 1.031
s 0.152 0.152 0.078 0.149 0.228 0.101 0.146 0.173 0.226 0.162 0.587 1.123 1.010 8.333
sPO 0.313 0.313 0.157 0.271 0.313 0.209 0.301 0.315 0.425 0.315 0.598 5.009 16.667 16.667
Table 6.4: Disproportionality indices analyzed by Karpov [55] for Example 6.5.1
The indices consider the first assignment as the best one (with the only exception
of the Aleskerov-Platonov index R) but the values confirm that the assignment sPO
is the worst under all the indices, having always the largest value in each column.
Next, we compute the Shapley-Shubik index and the Public Good index referring
to the three seat distributions and to the vote share, v :
A B C
φ(v) 13
1
3
1
3
φ(sPP )
1
2
1
2 0
φ(s) 46
1
6
1
6
φ(sPO)
1
3
1
3
1
3
H(v) 13
1
3
1
3
H(sPP )
1
2
1
2 0
H(s) 24
1
4
1
4
H(sPO)
1
3
1
3
1
3
Table 6.5: Power indices for Example 6.5.1
Computing the indices by Ortona, Fragnelli and Gambarelli-Biella we obtain the
following table:
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r rΩ(φ) rΩ(H) ∆(φ) ∆(H)
sPP 0 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333
s 0.333 0.333 0.167 0.333 0.167
sPO 0.667 0 0 0.313 0.313
Table 6.6: Added disproportionality indices for Example 6.5.1
The index by Ortona that does not account the power assigns the worst value to
assignment sPO. The behaviour of this index is similar to the ones of the previous
indices and sPP is the best one, even having assigned a value 0 of disproportionality.
Assignment sPO, on the other hand, receives the best score under the index by Fragnelli
that is strongly power-oriented; the index by Gambarelli-Biella is influenced by the seat
assignment and provides an intermediate result.
Example 6.5.2. In this second situation, we consider again three parties A,B, C that
receive a percentage of votes of 49.9%, 25.2%, 24.9%; we analyze two different Par-
liaments with 9 and 10 seats, respectively; finally we compute the assignment of the
seats under PP (sPP ) and looking at the power distribution (sPO):
A B C
9 sPP 5 2 2
sPO 4 3 2
10 sPP 5 3 2
sPO 4 3 3
Table 6.7: Seat distribution for Example 6.5.2
Note that assignment sPP gives to party A the absolute majority in the Parliament
with 9 seats and the veto power with 10 seats, differently from the distribution of
votes and assignment sPO.
Computing the abovementioned disproportionality indices in Example 6.5.2 we
obtain the following table:
MD ILH IL Lsq G IRae IGr IM IGa IR IS SL R Ho
9 sPP 0.057 0.057 0.043 0.049 0.057 0.038 0.042 0.059 0.078 0.056 0.579 0.013 1.113 1.113
sPO 0.081 0.081 0.068 0.072 0.082 0.054 0.061 0.087 0.119 0.084 0.584 0.035 1.323 1.323
10 sPP 0.049 0.049 0.025 0.049 0.073 0.033 0.037 0.059 0.079 0.056 0.580 0.019 1.096 1.190
sPO 0.099 0.099 0.074 0.086 0.100 0.066 0.074 0.103 0.143 0.102 0.583 0.039 1.198 1.205
Table 6.8: Disproportionality indices analyzed by Karpov [55] for Example 6.5.2
Again, the assignment sPO is the worst under all the indices, with both 9 and 10
seats, even if the absolute majority given to party A when there are 9 seats and the
veto power when there are 10 seats make the system not exactly corresponding to the
will of the voters. We decide to evaluate the disproportionality using the three added
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disproportionality indices. The values of the Shapley-Shubik index and of the Public
Good index are shown in Table 6.9.
A B C
φ(v) 13
1
3
1
3
9 φ(sPP ) 1 0 0
φ(sPO)
1
3
1
3
1
3
10 φ(sPP )
4
6
1
6
1
6
φ(sPO)
1
3
1
3
1
3
H(v) 13
1
3
1
3
9 H(sPP ) 1 0 0
H(sPO)
1
3
1
3
1
3
10 H(sPP )
2
4
1
4
1
4
H(sPO)
1
3
1
3
1
3
Table 6.9: Power indices for Example 6.5.2
Computing the indices by Ortona, Fragnelli and Gambarelli-Biella we obtain the
results shown in Table 6.10.
r rΩ(φ) rΩ(H) ∆(φ) ∆(H)
9 sPP 0 0.667 0.667 0.667 0.667
sPO 0.250 0 0 0.081 0.081
10 sPP 0 0.333 0.167 0.333 0.167
sPO 0.200 0 0 0.099 0.099
Table 6.10: Added disproportionality indices for Example 6.5.2
Again, the index by Ortona assigns the worst value to assignments sPO, that re-
ceives the best score under the two power-oriented indices. Moreover, Fragnelli index,
which is based only on the power issue, considers the assignment sPO as “perfect”, as
it gives 0 as disproportionality value. This is simply due to the fact that the power
distribution in the seat and in the vote shares are identical. Differently from Example
6.5.1, in which the sPO assignment was very far from the sPP assignment, in this case
there is only a small variation in the seat distribution, allowing the power to be better
shared between parties. sPO has been obtained simply through a different apportion-
ment: the rests have been given in order to have the share of power the most similar
to the one of the votes.
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6.6 Application to the Russian Parliament
In the work of Karpov the proposed disproportionality indices are computed for the
elections to the State Duma (Russian Parliament) referring to four electoral sessions:
1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007. The results are shown in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 of the
cited paper. In Table 6.11 we show the results for the three added indices, completing
the analysis. The values of the Shapley-Shubik index and of the Public Good index
will be shown in Chapter 7, where we analyze in details the algorithms we used for the
computation. In particular, in evaluating the power on the vote share of the former
elections, we had the problem of finding exact and efficient algorithms able to deal
with such a high number of players. Such an algorithm already existed to compute the
Shapley-Shubik index and it was based on generating functions. From that we had the
idea of building a new algorithm, based again on generating functions, to evaluate the
Public Good index exactly and efficiently. This brought to a new research work, which
is presented in the next chapter and which constitutes the last part of this thesis.
r rΩ(φ) rΩ(H) ∆(φ) ∆(H)
1995 0.6129 0.4298 0.9063 0.2178 0.3098
1999 0.1843 0.0624 0.3818 0.0503 0.1741
2003 0.4170 0.4213 0.9548 0.4213 0.9548
2007 0.2038 0 0 0.0498 0.0498
Table 6.11: Added disproportionality indices for Duma
Analyzing the indices, Karpov observed that almost all of them create the same
ordering, that the Parliament of 1999 is the most proportional and the Parliament of
1995 is the least one. This is still true for the results obtained evaluating the Ortona
index, and we can notice that, also computing the other two indices that take into
account the role of the power, the Parliament of 1999 has a very low disproportionality
value, but the best score is given to the Parliament of 2007. Fragnelli index accounts
it for perfect proportionality; this is due to the particular situation that United Russia
got the absolute majority both on the vote share (64.30%) and on the seat share
(70.00%), so it got the whole power and the differences on vote and seat shares have
no relevance at all.
This fact underlines that, even if from the academic examples we have shown that
to evaluate disproportionality taking into account the power can give very different
results from evaluating it with classical indices, it is possible that a Parliament has a
good evaluation from both points of view, enforcing the approaches and showing that
they are not necessarily conflicting.
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6.7 A Possible New Apportionment Rule
The different values of the indices for the different Parliaments suggest that they are
suitable for measuring the disproportionality more of a Parliament than of the adopted
electoral system.
The issue of power allows new perspective for analyzing the disproportionality. The
situation in Example 6.5.1 is designed in order to have the maximal impact on the
reader, using a very limited number of seats. We want to make clear that with a higher
number of seats it is possible to reduce the differences in the values of the indices for
the three assignment systems. Moreover, the equal distribution of power on the votes
and on the seats could be obtained with a very reasonable distribution of seats. For
instance, using the same percentages of votes with 15 seats, the assignment rules sPP
and s correspond to (8, 7, 0) and (7, 7, 1), respectively, and the first is easily rejected
because Party A would have the absolute majority. If we want to guarantee the same
distribution of power on the votes and on the seats it is sufficient to assign to each
party a number of seats greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 7, i.e.
sPO can be selected equal to s. This remark may be exploited for designing a rule for
assigning the rests in a proportional system (pure proportional, threshold proportional,
prized proportional, etc.) in order to minimize the differences of the distribution of
power on the votes and on the seats.
In this regard, we consider the situation in Example 6.7.1
Example 6.7.1. Five parties A,B, C,D,E receive a percentage of votes of
37.58%, 22.35%, 20.35%, 11.38%, 8.34%, respectively and 100 seats have to be as-
signed. In Table 6.12 we show the power on the vote share according to the Shapley-
Shubik index. If we assign respectively 37, 22, 20, 11 and 8 seats, corresponding to
A B C D E
φ(v) 1230
7
30
7
30
2
30
2
30
Table 6.12: The Shapley-Shubik index referred to the vote share for Example 6.7.1
the integer part of the percentages, as we are allocating 100 seats, the problem of the
apportionment consists in assigning the last two remaining seats. Assuming that at
most one additional seat can be assigned to each party (this is normally accepted by
most of the allocation rules based on proportionality) , we have 10 different possible
apportionments as shown in Table 6.13.
The corresponding power on the seat share is shown in Table 6.14.
We can immediately notice that in the previous example, against any intuition, the
perfect proportional system is the only one which does guarantees an exact distribution
of power between the vote and the seat share, i.e. the only one in which the Fragnelli
index (see Section 6.3) has value strictly bigger than zero. The interesting conclusion
after analyzing this simple example is that it may be possible to maintain the same
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A B C D E
s1 38 23 20 11 8
s2 38 22 21 11 8
s3 ≡ sPP 38 22 20 12 8
s4 38 22 20 11 9
s5 37 23 21 11 8
s6 37 23 20 12 8
s7 37 23 20 11 9
s8 37 22 21 12 8
s9 37 22 21 11 9
s10 37 22 20 12 9
Table 6.13: Different apportionments for Example 6.7.1
power share simply assigning the rests, without totally upsetting the seat distribution.
This suggests that also in real cases, assigning the seats proportionally and solving
the problem of the apportionment of the rests via a minimization of a power-based
disproportionality index, like Fragnelli index, may provide interesting results, reducing
the differences of power while using a strictly proportional system.
A more challenging proposal is to design an apportionment rule that, starting with
a fixed number of seats (or better with a range for the number of seats), assigns the
seats to the parties in order to minimize the difference in the two power distributions.
We may go further, supposing to assign a different weight to the members of the
different parties in order to have the same distribution of power on the votes and on
the seats. A similar idea was already used for designing the VAP (Voting A Posteriori)
system (see Fragnelli and Ortona [35]), where the different weights of the votes were
introduced to increase the governability of the Parliament.
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A B C D E
φ(s1)
12
30
7
30
7
30
2
30
2
30
φ(s2)
12
30
7
30
7
30
2
30
2
30
φ(sPP )
27
60
12
60
12
60
7
60
2
60
φ(s4)
12
30
7
30
7
30
2
30
2
30
φ(s5)
12
30
7
30
7
30
2
30
2
30
φ(s6)
12
30
7
30
7
30
2
30
2
30
φ(s7)
12
30
7
30
7
30
2
30
2
30
φ(s8)
12
30
7
30
7
30
2
30
2
30
φ(s9)
12
30
7
30
7
30
2
30
2
30
φ(s10)
12
30
7
30
7
30
2
30
2
30
Table 6.14: The Shapley-Shubik index referred to the different seat shares for example
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7.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to find an efficient way to evaluate the Public Good index, also
called the Holler index [48] (see Section 2.2.2, Formula (2.7)). This necessity came
while working on the research presented in Chapter 6, where we had to evaluate the
disproportionality of the Russian Duma through power-based indices, then computing
the power on the votes share. In this example, we had to deal with a very large number
of players and traditional algorithms did not allow us to make the computation simply
following the definition of the Public Good index. Differently from the best-known
measures of power, proposed by Shapley and Shubik [88] and Banzhaf ([12] and
[84]), the Holler index takes into account only the role of minimal winning coalitions.
Moreover, the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices agree that larger players (with a
high weight in weighted majority games) never have less power than smaller players1,
while this does not happen computing the power using the Holler index: situations
where minor players possess greater potential for power are not anomalous, but occur
rather frequently in real-world situations, as stated by Deegan and Packel [28].
1This property is called monotonicity
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The importance of minimal winning coalitions was largely studied and motivated
by Brams and Fishburn ([18] and [19]). Their work is based on Riker’s size principle
[85]. Riker shows that there are no circumstances wherein an incentive exists for
coalitions of greater than minimal winning size to form and, on the other hand, there
are sufficient incentives for such coalitions to form. His principle affirms that the real-
ization of the goal of winning takes form in the creation only of minimal winning size
coalitions, i.e. minimal winning coalitions with minimal weight. The ejection of the
superfluous members from one of them means that the same total amount of value
can be divided among the fewer members of the minimal winning coalition. Thus,
each of the members can derive more profit from it. Moreover, if the coalition payoff
is split between the members of the winning coalition according to their respective
weights, each member’s share will be maximized through the minimizing of the coali-
tion partners’ voting weights. A similar argument was adopted by Deegan and Packel
[27], who proposed a nonmonotonic index to evaluate the power which takes into
account only minimal winning coalitions and which assumes that each such coalition
has an equal probability of forming and that players inside a minimal coalition divide
the spoil equally.
Even if it is still focused on the minimality, the approach of Holler is totally dif-
ferent. He considers the coalition value to be a public good and any member of the
voting body whose preferences correspond with the outcome of the winning coalition
is considered as a member of the specific coalition. Some of these members are not
essential, because they do not influence the winning coalition, and they are said to be
merely lucky (according to Barry’s definition of luck [13]) and not able to exert power.
Then, he still considers only minimal winning coalitions, but this does not imply that
only minimal winning coalitions will form, but simply suggests that only these coali-
tions should be considered for measuring a priori voting power. The proposed index
is a normalized measure of the number of times a player is a member of a minimal
winning coalition.
The problem of calculating power indices in a reasonable amount of time is of
great interest since the first power indices have been defined. Some classical indices
require the enumeration of all coalitions and this becomes computationally complex
as soon as the number of players increases. This can happen also for those indices,
e.g. the Deegan-Packel and the Public Good indices, which take into account only
minimal winning coalitions: selecting the minimal winning ones may require, in the
worst case running, the enumeration of all of them.
Already in 1960, Mann and Shapley [62] faced the problem, proposing some varia-
tions of Monte Carlo sampling methods and obtaining an approximation of the Shapley
value [86]. Two years later they proposed an exact calculation [63], following an idea
due to David G. Cantor, to evaluate this index for large voting games (in the litera-
ture and in this paper, large voting games are voting games with, generically, a high
number of players) when they can be written through a weighted majority situation.
This idea has made possible to calculate the exact power in a reasonable amount of
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time and it is based on generating functions. Brams and Affuso [17] used a similar
approach for computing the Banzhaf index. Bilbao et al. [15] applied this generating
functions approach and obtained the complexity bound for the algorithms to evaluate
the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices. Due to the power of this tool, the Span-
ish scholars dedicated several works to the development of efficient algorithms based
on generating functions: Fernández et al. [31] computed the Myerson value [74] in
weighted majority games restricted by a tree, Algaba et al. [2] dealt with the problem
of computing the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices for weighted multiple ma-
jority games and Alonso-Meijide and Bowles [6] applied this method to the coalitional
power indices, e.g. Owen index [81]. Algaba et al. [1] used generating functions
to analyze the distribution of voting power in the Constitution for the enlarged Eu-
ropean Union, while Alonso-Meijide et al. [5] computed coalitional power indices in
weighted multiple majority games and compared these indices for new decision rules
proposed by the Council of the European Union. The computational implementation
of this method is efficient and simple: once the generating function has been defined
and the algorithm provided, a program to implement it requires a basic knowledge
of programming. This chapter focuses on generating functions method with the aim
to apply it to the computation of the Public Good index, and our work is to pro-
vide the generating function and the algorithm for this purpose. We underline that
this method can be applied only to weighted majority games. In all the other cases, it
is not possible to use a generating functions approach to the computation of any value.
Anyway, for sake of completeness, we mention other approaches: the work of
Owen ([79] and [80]), who proposed approximation algorithms based on multilinear
extensions for calculating the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices, later modified
by Leech [59], who proposed a hybrid with the direct application of the definitions
of the indices, and the work of Matsui and Matsui [65], who showed enumeration
algorithms for calculating the two above indices and the Deegan-Packel index.
Using generating functions, the main difference between the Banzhaf index and
the Shapley-Shubik index is that the first one needs only to take into account the
weight of a given coalition, in order to verify if a player is critical in it, while the
second one results a bit more complicated, as it has to keep the information regarding
the cardinality of the coalition.
The Public Good index takes into account only minimal winning coalitions and
counts how many of them a player belongs to. Basically, it counts the number of
times a player is critical, but only related to the minimal winning coalitions. Then,
it is natural for us to use what it has already been done for the computation of the
Banzhaf index and to try to modify it in order to obtain an exact and efficient com-
putation of the Holler index. Unfortunately, doing this a lot of problems arise. This
requires building a generating function to evaluate only the numbers of minimal win-
ning coalitions, but it is also fundamental to know when a given player belongs to one
of the nonminimal ones or to one of the minimal ones and then it remains critical,
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precisely because of the minimality. As it is not possible to do that defining a gener-
ating function which is similar to the ones used to compute the Shapley-Shubik and
the Banzhaf indices, in this chapter we introduce some recursive generating functions,
using a noncommutative operator, which allow us to compute the Public Good index
exactly and efficiently.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 7.2 we present the generating
functions approach to compute the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices, while in
Section 7.3 we define the new generating function to compute the Public Good index,
proving it is suitable for our purpose. An example of how algorithm works, in which
we explain all the steps in detail, is provided in Section 7.4. Some computational
complexity results are shown in Section 7.5 and the algorithm is applied to evaluate
the power in the Russian Duma in Section 7.6. Section 7.7 concludes proposing some
possible extensions of the results.
7.2 Generating Functions for Computing the Shapley-Shubik
and the Banzhaf Indices
Bilbao et al. [15] recalled a combinatorial method based on generating functions for
computing the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices exactly and efficiently in the
case of weighted majority games. The number of elements f (k) of a finite set can
be determined by its generating function. The ordinary generating function of f (k) is
the formal power series ∑
k∈N
f (k)xk .
We call it formal because we ignore evaluation on particular values of x and prob-
lems on convergence and we pay attention only to the coefficient of the polynomial.
For example, if we are interested in the number of coalitions of weight h, given the
appropriate formal serie
∑
k∈N b(k)x
k , the coefficient b(h) will give us the cardinality
of the set of coalitions of weight h.
We can work with generating functions of several variables, as∑
k∈N
∑
j∈N
f (k, j)xkx j .
Example 7.2.1. For each n ∈ N, the number of subsets of k elements of the set
N = {1, . . . , n} is given by the explicit formula of the binomial coefficients(
n
k
)
=
n!
k!(n − k)! =
n(n − 1) · · · (n − k + 1)
k!
.
A generating function approach to binomial coefficients may be obtained as follows.
Let S = {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of n elements. Regard the elements x1, . . . , xn as
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independent indeterminates. It is an immediate consequence of the process of multi-
plication that
(1 + x1) · · · (1 + xn) =
∑
T⊆S
∏
xi∈T
xi .
Note that if T = ∅, then we obtain 1. If we put each xi = x , we obtain
(1 + x)n =
∑
T⊆S
∏
x∈T
x =
∑
T⊆S
x |T | =
∑
k∈N
(
n
k
)
xk .
Then the generating function of the number
(
n
k
)
is (1 + x)n.
The Shapley-Shubik index for large voting games was computed exactly using
generating functions by David G. Cantor (Mann and Shapley [63] and Lucas [61]). He
observed that the Shapley-Shubik index of player i ∈ N satisfies
Φi(v) =
∑
{S/∈W :S∪{i}∈W}
s!(n − s − 1)!
n!
=
n−1∑
j=0
j!(n − j − 1)!
n!
 q−1∑
k=q−wi
A−i(k, j)
 ,
where A−i(k, j) is the number of coalitions S of j players with i ∈ S and w(S) = k ,
i.e. the number of ways in which j players, other than i , can have a sum of weights
equal to k . It is possible now to build the generating function of two variables of the
number A−i(k, j), and to easily evaluate the Shapley-Shubik index.
Proposition 7.2.1. (Cantor) Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted majority situation.
Then the generating function of the number A−i(k, j) is given by ShG−i(x, z) =∏
j=1,...,n, j 6=i(1 + zw
xj ).
A similar approach was applied by Brams and Affuso [17] for computing the nor-
malized Banzhaf index, noticing that the number of times a player i is critical satisfies
β∗i (v) = |{S /∈ W : S ∪ {i} ∈ W}|
=
q−1∑
k=q−wi
b−i(k),
where b−i(k) is the number of coalitions that do not include i with weight k . Now we
need to write the generating function of one variable of the number b−i(k) in order
to evaluate the Banzhaf index.
Proposition 7.2.2. (Brams-Affuso) Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted majority situ-
ation. Then the generating function of the number b−i(k) of coalitions S such that
i /∈ S, and w(s) = k , is given by BG−i(v) =
∏
j=1,...,n, j 6=i(1 + x
wj ).
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7.3 Generating Function for Computing the Public Good
Index
In this section, taking inspiration from the results proposed in the previous one, we
present a combinatorial method based on generating functions for computing the
Holler index exactly and efficiently. BG−i(v) is derived by the following generating
function
∏n
i=1(1 + x
wi ) =
∑
k∈N b(k)x
k , which permits to obtain the number b(k) of
coalitions with weight k . To obtain the number b−i(k), we delete the factor (1+xwi ).
In order to evaluate the Holler index, however, it is still necessary to have the number
of coalitions with weight k , but with the requirement of being minimal in case they
are winning.
We start defining the reduced weighted majority game when player i leaves as
the game obtained by the weighted majority situation [q−i ;w ′1, . . . , w
′
n−1], with q−i =
q − wi and w ′j = wj if j < i and w ′j = wj+1 if j > i . The sets of all winning coalitions
and of all minimal winning coalitions of the reduced game are denoted byW−i andWm−i
respectively and the reduced game can be simply denoted as (N,W−i) or as (N,Wm−i).
Lemma 7.3.1. S ∈ Wm−i and w(S) < q iff S ∪ {i} ∈ Wm.
Proof. It is trivial to observe that S is winning in the reduced game iff S ∪ {i} is
winning in the original game. We prove now that the minimality of S in (N,W−i)
together with the condition
∑
j∈S wj < q is equivalent to the minimality of S ∪ {i} in
(N,W ):
“⇒” As S is minimal in (N,W−i),
∑
j∈S\{k} wj < q−i for each k ∈ S and then∑
j∈S∪{i}\{k} wj =
∑
j∈S\{k} wj + wi < q−i + wi = q for each k ∈ S. Moreover, as∑
j∈S wj < q, the players in S have insufficient votes to win without the help of i
when the majority quota is q, i.e. also i is critical in S ∪ {i}.
“⇐” As S ∪ {i} is minimal in (N,W ), ∑j∈S∪{i}\{k} wj < q for each k ∈ S and then∑
j∈S\{k} wj < q − wi = q−i .
In order to evaluate the Public Good index (Formula 2.7), from Lemma 7.3.1 we get
that the number of minimal winning coalitions player i belongs to hi(v) = |Wmi | is
given by
hi(v) =
q−1∑
k=q−wi
bm−i(k), (7.1)
where bm−i(k) is the number of coalitions that do not include i with weight k and that
are minimal winning for the reduced game (N,W−i).
In order to compute the Holler index, we need then to define the generating function
of the numbers bm−i(k) for each player i ∈ N. We should notice that, in the above
formula, we sum only for k ≥ q − wi and then the coalitions are minimal winning
for the reduced game. In order to obtain the generating function, we have to obtain
values of bm−i(k) for every k ≥ 0, and then we will obtain also the number of coalitions
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of weight k which are losing for the reduced game.
Before doing that, we recall some basic notions of algebra. Every polynomial
P (x) can be written in the divisor-quotient form, this means that considering the
dividend and the divisor polynomials P (x) and D(x) with deg(D) < deg(P ), where
we denote with deg(A) the degree of the polynomial A, then for some quotient
and remainder polynomials Q(x) and R(x) with deg(R) < deg(D) we can write
P (x) = R(x) +Q(x) ·D(x).
Given q ∈ N, denoting as N[x ] the set of polynomials with coefficients in N, we
define the following noncommutative operator
⊗q : N[x ]× N[x ] −→ N[x ]
P (x)⊗q t(x) 7−→ R(x) · t(x) +Q(x) · xq
where R(x) and Q(x) are respectively the remainder and the quotient polynomials of
the divisor-quotient form P (x) = R(x) +Q(x) · xq.
Given the weighted majority situation [q;w1, . . . , wn] with the additional condition
that the players are ordered such that w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wn we denote
n⊗
i=1
q(1 + x
wi ) = (1 + xw1 )⊗q . . .⊗q (1 + xwn).
Given the weighted majority situation [q;w1, . . . , wn] with the additional condition
that the players are ordered such that w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wn, we define the associated Holler
recursive functions {HGr (x)}r=1,...,n as{
HG1(x) = 1 + xw1
HGr (x) = HGr−1(x)⊗q (1 + xwr ) r = 2 . . . n (7.2)
Given the reduced game [q−i ;w ′1, . . . , w
′
n−1], we denote as {HGr−i(x)}r=1,...,n−1
the associated Holler recursive functions and we note that, by definition
HGn−1−i (x) =
n−1⊗
r=1
q−i (1 + x
w ′r ).
Due to the noncommutativity of the operator, it is necessary to give an ordering
of the players to have the uniqueness of the definition of the recursive functions; in
particular, the reasons of the assumption of a weakly decreasing order will be discussed
in the proof of Proposition 7.3.2.
Proposition 7.3.2. Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted majority situation with w1 ≥
. . . ≥ wn. Then the generating function of the number bm−i(k) of coalitions S such
that i /∈ S, w(S) = k and S is either losing (if k < q) or minimal winning (if k ≥ q)
for the reduced game (N,W−i), is given by HGn−1−i (x) =
⊗n−1
r=1 q−i (1 + x
w ′r ).
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Proof. We need to prove that considering the weighted majority situation
[q−i ;w ′1, . . . , w
′
n−1], at step r , HG
r
−i(x) generates the number of either losing (if
k < q) or minimal winning (if k ≥ q) coalitions of weight k containing at most the
first r players. By induction, when r = 1, HG1−i(x) = 1 + x
w ′1 = x0 + xw
′
1 , that is a
coalition of weight 0 and a coalition of weight w ′1. The first one is the losing empty
coalition, the second one is losing if w ′1 < q−i and winning otherwise, also minimal as
it contains just one player.
Suppose now that HGr−1−i (x) generates the losing and the minimal winning coali-
tions of weight k formed by the first r − 1 players, then we can write
HGr−1−i (x) = R
r−1
−i (x) +Q
r−1
−i (x) · xq−i .
The coefficients of Qr−1−i (x) · xq−i are the number of minimal winning coalitions of
weight k , while the coefficients of Rr−1−i (x) are the number of losing coalitions of
weight k , both considering only the first r − 1 players. Then, at step r we get
HGr−i(x) = HG
r−1
−i (x)⊗q (1 + xwr ) = Rr−1−i (x) · (1 + xwr ) +Qr−1−i (x) · xq−i ,
the coefficients of Rr−1−i (x) · (1 +xwr ) are the number of losing subcoalitions of weight
k (if k < q) considering the first r players including or not player r , or the number of
winning subcoalitions of weight k (if k ≥ q), considering the first r players, including
player r and that were losing without player r . As w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wr , if these coalitions
are winning and become losing when player r leaves, they become losing when any
player of the coalition leaves, as they are formed by the first r players and the first
r − 1 players have weight larger than or equal to wr . Then, the decreasing ordering
of the weights of the players provides the minimality of the coalitions formed during
the procedure.
It is important to remark that, obviously, an implementation of the procedure does
not need to operate divisions between polynomials. As the divisor is simply a monic
monomial, a check on the degree of the monomials of the dividend polynomial is
sufficient to obtain the quotient and the remainder polynomials.
7.4 Building the Generating Functions for the German Bun-
destag
In order to provide an example of the procedure, we recall Section 4.4, where we illus-
trated the situation of the German Parliament on 3 March 2011. The 17th German
Bundestag counted 620 Members, divided in 5 parliamentary groups, and can be rep-
resented through the following weighted majority situation [311; 237, 146, 93, 76, 68].
From now on, we will refer to the parties as 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, instead of CDU/CSU,
SPD, FDP, Die Linke and Die Grünen. We go over again the algorithm to calculate
the Public Good index explaining all the steps in detail.
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The reduced weighted majority game when player 1 leaves is the one associated to
the following weighted majority situation [74; 146, 93, 76, 68]. The associated Holler
recursive function (Formula 7.2) is given by
HG1−1(x) = 1 + x
146
HG2−1(x) = HG
1
−1(x)⊗74 (1 + x93)
= 1 · (1 + x93) + x146 = 1 + x93 + x146
HG3−1(x) = HG
2
−1(x)⊗74 (1 + x76)
= 1 · (1 + x76) + x93 + x146
= 1 + x76 + x93 + x146
HG4−1(x) = HG
3
−1(x)⊗74 (1 + x68)
= 1 · (1 + x68) + x76 + x93 + x146
= 1 + x68 + x76 + x93 + x146
According to Proposition 7.3.2, HG4−1(x) is the generating function of the number
bm−1(k) of coalitions S such that 1 /∈ S, w(S) = k and S is either losing (if k < 74)
or minimal winning (if k ≥ 74) for the reduced game (N,W−1), then from Formula
(7.1) we get
h1(v) =
310∑
k=74
bm−1(k) = 3.
The reduced weighted majority game when player 2 leaves is the one associated to
the following weighted majority situation [165; 237, 93, 76, 68]. The associated Holler
recursive function is given by
HG1(x) = 1 + x237
HG2−2(x) = HG
1
−2(x)⊗165 (1 + x93)
= 1 · (1 + x93) + x237 = 1 + x93 + x237
HG3−2(x) = HG
2
−2(x)⊗165 (1 + x76)
= (1 + x93) · (1 + x76) + x237
= 1 + x76 + x93 + x169 + x237
HG4−2(x) = HG
3
−2(x)⊗165 (1 + x68)
= (1 + x76 + x93) · (1 + x68) + x169 + x237
= 1 + x68 + x76 + x93 + x144 + x161 + x169 + x237
then
h2(v) =
310∑
k=165
bm−2(k) = 2.
The reduced weighted majority game when player 3 leaves is the one associated
to the following weighted majority situation [218; 237, 146, 76, 68]. The associated
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Holler recursive function is given by

HG1−3(x) = 1 + x
237
HG2−3(x) = HG
1
−3(x)⊗218 (1 + x146)
= 1 · (1 + x146) + x237 = 1 + x146 + x237
HG3−3(x) = HG
2
−3(x)⊗218 (1 + x76) = (1 + x146) · (1 + x76) + x237
= 1 + x76 + x146 + x222 + x237
HG4−3(x) = HG
3
−3(x)⊗218 (1 + x68)
= (1 + x76 + x146) · (1 + x68) + x222 + x237
= 1 + x68 + x76 + x93 + x144 + x146 + x214 + x222 + x237
then
h3(v) =
310∑
k=218
bm−3(k) = 2.
The reduced weighted majority game when player 4 leaves is the one associated
to the following weighted majority situation [235; 237, 146, 93, 68]. The associated
Holler recursive function is given by

HG1−4(x) = 1 + x
237
HG2−4(x) = HG
1
−4(x)⊗235 (1 + x146)
= 1 · (1 + x146) + x237 = 1 + x146 + x237
HG3−4(x) = HG
2
−4(x)⊗235 (1 + x93)
= (1 + x146) · (1 + x93) + x237
= 1 + x93 + x146 + x237 + x239
HG4−4(x) = HG
3
−4(x)⊗235 (1 + x68)
= (1 + x93 + x146) · (1 + x68) + x237 + x239
= 1 + x68 + x93 + x146 + x161 + x214 + x237 + x239
then
h4(v) =
310∑
k=235
bm−4(k) = 2.
Finally, the reduced weighted majority game when player 5 leaves is the one asso-
ciated to the following weighted majority situation [243; 237, 146, 93, 76]. The asso-
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ciated Holler recursive function is given by
HG1−5(x) = 1 + x
237
HG2−5(x) = HG
1
−5(x)⊗243 (1 + x146)
= (1 + x237) · (1 + x146)
= 1 + x146 + x237 + x383
HG3−5(x) = HG
2
−5(x)⊗243 (1 + x93)
= (1 + x146 + x237) · (1 + x93) + x383
= 1 + x93 + x146 + x237 + x239 + x330 + x383
HG4−5(x) = HG
3
−5(x)⊗243 (1 + x76)
= (1 + x93 + x146 + x237 + x239) · (1 + x76) + x330 + x383
= 1 + x76 + x93 + x146 + x169 + x222 + x237 + x239 + x313 + x315
+x330 + x383
then
h5(v) =
310∑
k=243
bm−5(k) = 0.
Because of Formula (2.7), the Public Good index of the game is given by the normal-
ized vector of the hi(v), then
H(v) =
(
3
9
,
2
9
,
2
9
,
2
9
, 0
)
.
7.5 Computational Complexity
Bilbao et al. [15] analyzed the computational complexity of the algorithms based on
generating functions to evaluate the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices, observ-
ing that in a classical procedure, if the input size of the problem is n, the function
which measures the worst case running time for computing the indices is O(2n). They
assumed a logarithmic cost model. In this model, if we perform only a polynomial
number of operations on numbers with at most a polynomial number of digits, then
the algorithm will be polynomial (Gács and Lovász [37]). Given f (n) a function from
Z+ to Z+, we denote O(f (n)) for the set of all functions g such that f (n) ≤ cg(n) for
n ≥ n0. Then a polynomial of degree d is in O(nd), this means that only asymptotic
behavior of the function as n → +∞ is being considered.
Bilbao et al. proved the following two results:
Theorem 7.5.1. Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted majority situation. If C is the
number of nonzero coefficients of BG(x), then the time complexity of the generating
algorithm for the Banzhaf index is O(n2C).
Theorem 7.5.2. Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted majority situation. If C is the num-
ber of nonzero coefficients of ShG(x, z), then the time complexity of the generating
algorithm for the Shapley-Shubik index is O(n2C).
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We assume the same logarithmic cost model and we can now enunciate the fol-
lowing theorem. The proof traces the proof of Theorem 7.5 given by Bilbao et al.
[15].
Theorem 7.5.3. Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a weighted majority situation. If C is the num-
ber of nonzero coefficients of HGn−1−i (x), then the time complexity of the generating
algorithm for the Holler index is O(n2C).
Proof. Let i be a player, q−i the majority quota of the reduced game (N,W−i) asso-
ciated to the weighted majority situation [q−i , w ′1, . . . , w
′
n−1], the function HG
n−1
−i (x)
is given by
Q← q−i
HG(x)← 1
for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with j 6= i do
HHG(x)← polynomial given by the monomials of HG(x) of deg < Q
HG(x)← HG(x) +HHG(x)xwj
endfor
For every player the time to compute the line in the loop is in O(C), then the time to
compute the complete function is O(nC). To compute the Holler index we consider
HGn−1i (x) =
∑
k∈N b
m
−i(k)x
k for player i ∈ N and the for loop
w ← wi
s ← 0
for k ∈ {q − w, . . . , q − 1} do
s ← s + bm−i(k)
endfor
The time spent in the above loop is O(C). Then, the total time in the procedure for
each player is O(nC), executed n times we get a time complexity of the generating
algorithm for the Public Good index of O(n2C).
7.6 The Russian State Duma: a Real-World Example
In real-world situations, examples with a high number of parties can require fast algo-
rithms to evaluate power indices efficiently. In the previous chapter we dealt with the
problem of evaluating the power given by the vote share after the election of the Rus-
sian Parliament (State Duma). In particular, referring to the situation of 1995, which
counted 43 parties submitted to the vote, in Table 7.1 we have a summary of parties
and coalitions which participated in this election, with the vote share in percentage
in the first column and the Shapley-Shubik, the normalized Banzhaf and the Public
Good indices in the other three ones. The indices have been evaluated using generating
functions algorithms; for the first two ones we implemented two algorithms following
the generating function approach shown in Section 7.2, for the Public Good index
we implemented the new algorithm following the new generating function approach
proposed in Section 7.3. All these algorithms have been implemented in Matlab. We
should remark that, as the vote share is not given by integer numbers, the weights
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and the quota have been multiplied by one hundred. These algorithms provide a result
in few seconds, while other algorithms not based on generating functions cannot even
deal with such a big number of parties.
The vote share of “Against all” and of “Invalid ballots” has been included, in order
to have a total vote share summing up to 1, but this two lines have been obviously
eliminated by the evaluation of power and the quota adapted to the majority reachable
by the other parties. The resulting game is then given by the weighted majority
situation with n = 43 players and a majority quota of q = 4765. We may notice that
the power obtained using, for example, the Shapley-Shubik index differs a lot from the
power obtained evaluating the Holler index. In particular the Holler index gives 1/10
of power to the biggest party KPRF.
7.7 Concluding Remarks
The Public Good index represents a different approach in evaluating the power. Then,
it is important to have a powerful instrument for being able to efficiently compute
thix index. A very famous example to show how the Holler index can provide some
results which are very different from the ones provided by classical indices is the UNSC
(see Section 5.1). Referring to the decisions on substantive matters, we represent the
UNSC by the following weighted majority situation
[39; 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]. We compute the voting power in it, remem-
bering one more time that the Holler index is based on a totally different approach
which takes into account only minimal winning coalitions. As a result, the power of
smaller players (the nonpermanent members) is bigger compared to the power as-
signed to them by the other measures of power. We show the results in Table 7.2
where P stands for permanent and NP for non permanent. We can notice that
the Shapley-Shubik index evaluates the power of a permanent member more than 100
times the power of a nonpermanent member, the Banzhaf index more than 10 times
while the Holler index suggests a ratio of only 5/2.
In our opinion, generating functions methods are, without any doubt, the most
powerful instrument to compute power indices in weighted majority games, and this
idea is confirmed by the interest that many researchers, mainly from Spain, showed
for this topic. Our work provides a new approach to deal with an index based on
minimal winning coalitions. The same approach, together with the idea proposed to
evaluate the Shapley-Shubik index, which permits to take into account the cardinality
of a coalition, may be applied to obtain a generating function to compute the Deegan-
Packel index. This index has already been studied according to a different generating
function by Alonso-Meijide [3]. Then, it can be interesting to make a comparison
of the two methods in dealing with minimal winning coalitions. Moreover, some
variations of the Public Good index were proposed, like for example the ones proposed
by Alonso-Meijide et al. [8], and our algorithm can be modified and applied to their
implementation.
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Parties Votes % φ β H
KPRF - Comm. Party of the Russian Fed. 22.3 0.2822 0.3053 0.0235
LDPR - Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 11.18 0.1157 0.1041 0.0234
NDR - Our Home Russia 10.13 0.1039 0.0969 0.0234
Yabloko 6.89 0.0684 0.0659 0.0234
ZhR - Women of Russia 4.61 0.0448 0.0440 0.0234
Communist and Working Russia 4.53 0.0440 0.0432 0.0234
KRO - Congress of Russian Communities 4.31 0.0418 0.0411 0.0234
Party of Workers’ Self-Government 3.98 0.0385 0.0380 0.0234
Democratic Russia’s Choice 3.86 0.0373 0.0369 0.0234
APR - Agrarian Party of Russia 3.78 0.0365 0.0361 0.0234
Strong State 2.57 0.0246 0.0245 0.0234
Forward Russia 1.94 0.0185 0.0185 0.0234
Power to the People 1.61 0.0153 0.0154 0.0234
Pamfilova - Gurov-V, Lysenko 1.6 0.0152 0.0153 0.0234
Trade Unions and Industrialists 1.55 0.0147 0.0148 0.0234
Environmental Party of Russia “Kedr” 1.39 0.0132 0.0133 0.0234
Bloc of Ivan Rybkin 1.11 0.0105 0.0106 0.0234
Bloc of Stanislav 0.99 0.0093 0.0095 0.0234
My Fatherland 0.72 0.0068 0.0069 0.0234
Common Cause 0.68 0.0064 0.0065 0.0234
Beer Lovers’ Party 0.62 0.0058 0.0059 0.0234
All Russian Muslim Public Movement “Nur” 0.57 0.0054 0.0054 0.0234
Transformation of the Fatherland 0.49 0.0046 0.0047 0.0234
Transformation of the Fatherland 0.49 0.0046 0.0047 0.0234
National Republican Party of Russia 0.48 0.0045 0.0046 0.0234
Electoral Bloc 1 0.47 0.0044 0.0045 0.0234
PRES - Party of Russian Unity and Accord 0.36 0.0034 0.0034 0.0234
Russian Lawyers’ Association 0.35 0.0033 0.0033 0.0234
For Motherland! 0.28 0.0026 0.0027 0.0234
Christian-Democratic Union - Christians o Russia 0.28 0.0026 0.0027 0.0234
Electoral Bloc 2 0.21 0.0020 0.0020 0.0234
People’s Union 0.19 0.0018 0.0018 0.0234
Bloc “Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov” 0.15 0.0014 0.0014 0.0234
Social Democrats 0.13 0.0012 0.0012 0.0234
Party of Economic Freedom 0.13 0.0012 0.0012 0.0234
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ROD - Russian All-People’s Movement 0.12 0.0011 0.0011 0.0234
Bloc of Independents 0.12 0.0011 0.0011 0.0234
FDD - Federal Democratic Movement 0.12 0.0011 0.0011 0.0234
Socio-political Movement “Stable Russia” 0.12 0.0011 0.0011 0.0234
Duma - 96 0.08 0.0007 0.0008 0.0225
Frontier Generations 0.06 0.0006 0.0006 0.0216
89 0.06 0.0006 0.0006 0.0216
Interethnic Union 0.06 0.0006 0.0006 0.0216
Against all 2.77 - - -
Invalid ballots 1.91 - - -
Total 100 1 1 1
Table 7.1: December 17, 1995 Russian State Duma, vote share and power evaluated
using the Shapley-Shubik, the normalized Banzhaf and the Holler indices
P NP
φ(v) 4212145
4
2145
β(v) 2124096
21
4096
H(v) 545
2
45
Table 7.2: Power share in the UNSC

Chapter 8
General Conclusions
Game Theory applied to voting may bring rise to the study of many different topics.
In this thesis we presented some results in order to evaluate the voting systems, to
analyze the criteria for the assessment of the voters’ preferences and to provide more
functional ways to compute the existing instruments.
The goal of perfectly describing and analyzing voting situations is not in the near
future, but several researchers all over the world provided some very useful progresses
for this purpose. The bibliography of this thesis lists some of the major results in this
field and we hope that the research work contained in the thesis itself can provide
some small new steps and some suggestions for future analysis. We have already
listed, chapter by chapter, what we thought the possible development of the research
was, but we want to summarize here the points which are, in our opinion, crucial.
In Chapter 3, we investigated the way of combining a communication structure
with the already existing indices of power. We are totally convinced that the instru-
ments provided by the literature have to be taken into account as a valid starting point
in the description of a voting system, but, as it often happens, the models have to
aim at becoming more and more sophisticated, in order to catch the different facets
of the real-world problems. We remarked how the communication structures are not
able yet to represent every possible situation in which the set of feasible coalitions
is reduced, due to the different ideologies of the agents; moreover we presented the
possibility of assuming some coalitions as less probable, but not infeasible, as the po-
litical scenario is complex enough to admit the possibility of very unlikely coalitions to
form. A general model which is able to include and analyze every possible situation,
even if very difficult to find, should be the goal of every future research.
In Chapter 4, we added another important aspect to the problem; the alliances
inside a decisional situation are not stable, but may evolve with time, mainly due to the
fact that each agent aims at getting a higher power. We provided an instrument which,
theoretically, may perfectly describe this situation; unfortunately, the computational
complexity does not permit to adopt it in many real cases. At least in those situations
in which it is possible to evaluate it, or at least to know if a given solution belongs to
this set, we think it can be adopted for a good evaluation of the stability of a power
share.
Chapter 5 analyzes the problem of evaluating the power by another point of view,
the power to block instead of the power to win. We provided an index which evaluates
the veto power, but it can be extended in order to catch other characteristics of the
game, for example, the probability that a party takes a particular decision, or that not
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every member of a party is present at the vote.
A very high goal every research should aim for is the definition of a general model
for the evaluation of the power which takes into account all these aspects: the commu-
nication structure, the dynamic configuration of a decisional model and the important
role of a player in blocking a proposal and not only in making it approved. A model
which can include these (and possibly other) aspects may provide a better realistic
evaluation of the power in a complex and real decisional situation.
Chapter 6 considers a previous step of the formation of a democracy: the evalu-
ation of how good the resulting Parliament is after the electors have expressed their
preferences. This is probably the most actual and discussed aspect of the research
in voting theory, as many countries have to deal with a mechanism which does not
provide convincing results. But one more time, we think that the goodness of a Par-
liament mainly depends on the power share between the parties and not only on the
way the seats are allocated. Then, a good instrument for the evaluation of the power
can bring to a good evaluation of the representativeness of a Parliament.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we provided a new method to evaluate one of the existing
indices of power. In fact, even a possibly “perfect” power index can be very hard to
compute and it may turn out to be useless if we are not able to evaluate it in real-world
situations. This was the problem, for example, of the solution proposed in Chapter
4. It is important that the research continues in trying to find efficient algorithms to
make the computation of this and of other indices possible, at least in the near future.
We think that a mathematical approach to the study of voting systems can pro-
vide many improvements and many interesting results for a better organization of a
democracy. Optimization, simulation, Game Theory and many other branches of the
mathematical research can be very useful in order to better understand how this form
of government works and how it can evolve.
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